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THE TREASURY'S PROPOSALS FOR TAX




The U.S. Treasury Department's proposal entitled "Tax Reform for
Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth"1 is bold and exciting and will
generate much heated debate. It calls for a greatly broadened income base,
for full inclusion of all real capital gains, for comprehensive measures to
adjust for inflation, for depreciation allowances to approximate economic
depreciation, for the elimination of special tax preferences for specific
industries, for partial relief from the double taxation of dividends, for the
curtailment of tax shelters, for tax simplification and for substantially reduced
personal and corporate tax rates. These proposals are in response to
President Reagan's call for basic tax reform. In his State of the Union
address, the President said:
There is a better way: Let us go forward with an historic reform for fairness, simplicity
and incentives for growth. I am asking Secretary Don Regan for a plan for action to
simplify the entire tax code so all taxpayers, big and small, are treated more fairly. 2
In pursuing this mandate for comprehensive reform, the Treasury
Department focused on four options: A pure flat rate income tax, a modified
flat rate income tax, a tax on income that is consumed, and a general sales tax
levied either on value-added or retail sales. The objectives of the Treasury
Department included: "[L]ower marginal tax rates; reduced interference with
private economic decisions; simplicity; revenues equal to those of the existing
tax system; fairness for families; equal treatment of all sources and uses of
income; an unchanged distribution of tax burdens across income classes; and
encouragement to economic growth."'3 The Treasury concluded that a
"modified flat tax" levied on a much more comprehensive income base would
best reconcile such objectives. 4 The modified flat tax would replace the
present fourteen tax brackets ranging from 11% to 50% with three brackets
of 15%, 25%, and 35%. The Treasury believes that these large rate
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reductions will "open wide the doors of opportunity to those who are willing
to work, to save and invest, and to innovate."5  With the consequent
neutrality, investment decisions will be determined by economic rather than
tax considerations. This, the Treasury believes, will result in better allocation
of capital among industries and in accelerated growth. The Treasury warns
that unless broad reform is made and most special tax benefits are eliminated,
taxpayer morale will continue to deteriorate and it will be more and more
difficult to deny appeals by others for preferential treatment.6
It is surprising that a document suggesting so radical a change in the tax
system would originate from the Reagan Administration. But the proposals
are not radical from the perspective of income redistribution because there is
to be, in general, no change in the distribution of individual tax burdens
across income classes. The proposed broad-based and more neutral tax
system will not be without appeal to neoconservatives: The tax plan can be
interpreted as a denial of the government's role in formulating an industrial
policy, even a very generalized one, implemented through the tax system.
The diminishing band of "supply-siders" will be irate about the proposed
abolition of the investment tax credit and of the Accelerated Cost Recovery
System (ACRS) for the depreciation of capital assets. Persons who are less
ideologically inclined, in my opinion, will conclude that the Treasury
proposals are imbued with the spirit of true tax reform. The proposals go far
towards achieving horizontal equity.
Treasury Secretary Regan fully appreciated that the journey towards
fundamental tax reform will be difficult; he stated:
These proposals are bold, and they will be controversial. Those who benefit from the
current tax preferences that distort the use of our nation's resources, that complicate
paying taxes for all of us, and that create inequities and undermine taxpayer morale
will complain loudly and seek support from every quarter. But a far greater number of
Americans will benefit from the suggested rate reduction and simplification. The
achievement of fundamental tax reform-and the manifest benefits it would entail-
will require extraordinary leadership.
7
II
COMPARISONS WITH THE CARTER COMMISSION REPORT
The Treasury Department proposals are in some ways almost as
comprehensive as those of Canada's Carter Commission" of almost two
decades ago. The Carter Commission was so intellectually faithful to the
Haig-Simons definition of income 9 that it proposed the inclusion of gifts and
5. Id.
6. Id. at 25.
7. Id. at iv-v.
8. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM'N ON TAXATION (1966) (published in six volumes) (referred to as
the Carter Commission after its Chairman, Kenneth LeM. Carter) [hereinafter cited as CARTER
REPORT].
9. H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATON 50 (1938); Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and
Legal Aspects, reprinted in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54, 75 (R. Musgrave & C. Shoup
eds. 1959).
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inheritances in the income tax base of the recipient. Similarly, the Treasury
proposals will greatly expand the income tax base, but its proposals are
tempered to a greater extent by political realities. For example, gifts and
inheritances are not to be included in the income tax base due to recognition
of the squatter's, or vested, rights of estate and gift taxation. The Treasury
proposals would limit the deductibility of interest but would not eliminate the
current deduction for mortgage interest, although this deduction would be
restricted to mortgage interest on one principal residence. The Department
of the Treasury was tailoring its proposal to political realities. Having
suggested that state and local taxes should no longer be deductible, the
Treasury probably thought that it could not also curtail mortgage interest on
a principal residence nor repeal the tax exemption for general purpose state
and local government bonds.
The Treasury acknowledges that the interest exemption for state and local
government bonds cannot be reconciled with a comprehensive income tax,
that the subsidy it provides is inefficient with too much benefit accruing to
high income bondholders and too little cost savings to state and local
governments, and that the exemption is based on an outmoded
understanding of federalism. Nevertheless, the Treasury proposes only to
limit abuses because "this exemption appears to be an accepted part of the
fiscal landscape."' 0 This reluctance to deal with such a patent defect in the
income tax base stems in part from the political reality that the federal
government cannot gore state and local governments by both making their
taxes nondeductible and eliminating the tax subsidy of the interest
exemption. In part, it flows from undertaking tax reform when there is a $200
billion plus deficit and the mood of the President and the country is against
tax increases. These circumstances make it inappropriate to suggest direct
expenditure programs to replace existing ill-advised tax expenditures. Basic
tax reform is always exceedingly difficult; the budget deficit and the need to
cut expenditures compound the problem at this time.
Another similarity between the Carter Report and the Treasury proposal is
that each was presented as an integrated package. The Treasury stresses that
neutrality among industries can be achieved only by eliminating the special
preferences benefiting each industry." Like the Carter Report, the Treasury
proposals would replace percentage depletion and the expensing of
intangible drilling costs for the extractive industries with cost depletion to
achieve identical general rules for income measurement for all multiperiod
production. The Treasury also insists that many changes are mutually
dependent and must occur simultaneously if inequities, distortions or
complexities are to be avoided. 12 The preeminent example of this is the
comprehensive proposal for indexation or inflation-proofing of the tax
system. For example, the Treasury rightly emphasizes that "[a]llowing
10. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 135.
11. Id. at iv, 125.
12. Id. at iv.
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inflation adjustment for capital gains, depreciation, and inventories, without
also adjusting interest income and expense, would be neither fair nor
neutral."' 3 Inflation-proofing the income tax must be done comprehensively.
The Treasury cautions that changes in the package would require rate
structure changes in order to keep tax burdens constant across income classes
and in total. 14 Each deduction, deferral or credit that is retained contrary to
the proposal recommendations will inevitably mean that higher rates will be
necessary to achieve a given revenue target.
The Carter Report and the Treasury proposal differ with respect to
progressivity of the income tax. The Carter Commission had no doubts or
qualms about recommending a progressive tax structure. It expressed the
view that most government expenditures should be financed by taxes levied in
accordance with ability to pay, which means that "the government must seek
to impose progressive marginal rates on all additions to personal economic
power, without regard to the source of those increments in power."' 5 The
Carter Commission also believed that reducing the progressiveness of the
personal income tax would only modestly increase savings with a substantial
loss in vertical equity. 16
Within the last decade in western societies, there has been a significant
ideological shift towards neoconservatism which has probably proceeded
further in the United States than in Canada. 17 A manifestation of this shift is
the Treasury's rhetorical downplaying of progressivity, even though the
proposal's impact is to replicate exactly the present burden of distribution.
The plan, with its three tax brackets of 15%, 25%, and 35% applied to a much
broader tax base, is not described as a fairer and more effective progressive
tax system but as "a modified flat tax."' 8 It should not, however, be inferred
that the Treasury is unconcerned about vertical or distributional equity. The
Treasury rejected a pure flat rate tax-even one with generous personal
exemptions and zero-bracket amounts designed to levy no tax on persons at
or below the poverty level-because that would involve a substantial shift of
the tax burden from those in the highest income brackets to low and middle
income taxpayers.' 9 The prospect of massive redistribution of tax burdens
implicit in a revenue-neutral pure flat tax caused the Treasury to reject it.
The Treasury's commitment to a progressive tax system is also shown by its
proposal to tax the unearned income of children under fourteen years of age,
which is attributable to property transferred from their parents, at the
parents' marginal tax rates. The Treasury says that "[i]ncome splitting
undermines the progressive rate structure and is a source of unfairness in the
13. Id. at 99.
14. Id,
15. 2 CARTER REPORT, supra note 8, at 10.
16. Id at 178.
17. Nevitte & Gibbins, Neoconservatism: Canadian Variations on an Ideological Theme, 10 CANADxAN
PUB. POL'Y 384 (1984).
18. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 23.
19. Id. at 21-23.
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tax system," 20 and that its proposal "would help to ensure the integrity of the
progressive tax rate structure, which is designed to impose tax burdens in
accordance with each taxpayer's ability to pay." 2' The current dominance of
neoconservative ideology has resulted in a deemphasis of the virtue of a
progressive tax structure, but the belief in its essential fairness remains largely
unimpaired.
One other way in which the two tax plans differ is in their approach to
personal exemptions. Surprisingly, the Treasury takes a more liberal view of
the function of personal exemptions in an income tax system than did the
Carter Report. The Treasury proposal states that "[f]amilies with incomes at
or below the poverty level should not be subject to income tax."'2 2 In
contrast, the Carter Report stated:
The idea that income taxes should not reduce income below "subsistence" is laudable
in its intention but, we believe, misconceived. Subsistence has no absolute meaning.
It is the relative positions of individuals and families that are important. Furthermore,
neither exemptions from tax nor credits against tax can ensure that every Canadian
has a minimum income. This objective can only be achieved through increased
government transfer payments including, for example, refundable credits against
taxes. The income tax system as such cannot be used to help people without income-
those who most need the help.23
I have previously described this as callous nonsense. 24 Granted that
subsistence can have no absolute meaning and a positive tax system can do
nothing for those below the exemption level, an income tax nevertheless need
and should not exacerbate the problems of those in poverty through
unreasonably low personal exemptions.
The Carter Commission conveyed the impression that it was a good lesson
in citizenship for persons with less than subsistence income to pay some
income tax. As the Commission recognized that such persons would also pay
sales taxes and would bear part of the burden of municipal property taxes and
the corporate income tax, its approach to personal exemptions was
perplexing. The Commission was intent on achieving a tax system in which
middle and upper middle income Canadian taxpayers did not bear a
significantly higher burden than their counterparts in the United States.25 In
consequence, it proposed personal exemptions which were unduly low so that
tax rates could be held down. The Carter Report was certainly concerned
about the "brain drain";2 6 but while this is a legitimate concern it must also be
recognized that taxes represent the price paid for government services. As
the kind and level of services offered by the governments of Canada and the
20. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 92.
21. Id. at 94.
22. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 66.
23. 3 CARTER REPORT, supra note 8, at 21.
24. Bale, The Individual and Tax Reform in Canada, 49 CANLuN B. REV. 24, 59 (1971).
25. 3 CARTER REPORT, supra note 8, at 158. "We are, however, concerned with reducing
Canadian taxes on skilled workers and professionals to the point where there are no major tax
incentives for emigration to the United States." Id.
26. Id. The "brain drain" refers to the phenomenon of highly skilled and professional workers
leaving Canada for jobs in the United States or other foreign countries.
Page 151: Autumn 1985]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
United States differ, there is no reason to expect the price to be the same.
Equalization grants, which are paid to the provinces to ensure that all
Canadians can enjoy comparable levels of public service while paying only
comparable levels of taxation, have no counterpart in the United States.
Furthermore, the Canadian national health system also justifies substantially
higher taxes in Canada than in the United States, where health care is largely
privately financed.
Although changes in personal exemptions have in the past been
determined largely by revenue consideration, it is now recognized both in
Canada and in the United States that an income tax should not worsen the
condition of those with less than subsistence income. Personal exemptions or
zero-bracket amounts must therefore be set at levels which will shield persons
with only subsistence income from an income tax. This was clearly
acknowledged by the Treasury Report.
III
THE TREASURY REPORT
Considering all the tax reform measures contained in the Treasury Report
in one article is impossible. However, its flavor can be conveyed by brief
mention of some of the proposals. For instance, all employee fringe benefits
are to be taxed, with the exceptions of contributions to qualified retirement
plans and of health care premiums up to a designated limit.27 Thus, the
present exclusion for employer-provided group term life insurance and death
benefits is to be repealed, as well as the special treatment of incentive stock
options. 28 Even the exclusion for rental allowance or rental value of a
minister's home is to be abolished. 29 All unemployment compensation is to
be made taxable, and the tax exemption for workers' compensation is to be
repealed.30 This stringent tax treatment of ordinary employees is also to be
meted out to executives and the self-employed. To reduce abuses arising
from the deduction of personal living costs as business expenses, no
deduction will be allowed for most entertainment expenses and the business
travel deduction for meals and lodging will be limited.3t Tax treatment of the
elderly, blind, and disabled will be rationalized by providing them with a
single tax credit, including the additional personal exemptions, instead of the
special treatment they currently receive which gives more benefit to high
income taxpayers than to those who need assistance. 32 There are also many
proposals which limit tax shelter opportunities and will promote neutrality in
the taxation of business income.
27. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 73-74 (proposed premium limit set at $70 per month for a
single person and $175 per month for a family).
28. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 41-42.
29. Id. at 49-50.
30. Id. at 51-55.
31. Id. at 81-85, 86-90.
32. Itt at 9-11.
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The Treasury Report contains a comprehensive and balanced set of
proposals for fundamental tax reform. Four aspects of the Report will be
considered under the following headings: a) abolition of the deduction for
state and local taxes; b) termination of the alternative minimum tax; c)
inflation-proofing of the tax system; and d) the dividend-paid deduction for
corporations.
A. Abolition of the Deduction for State and Local Taxes
The proposal to phase out over a two-year period the itemized deduction
for state and local income taxes and other taxes that are not incurred in
carrying on a trade or business 33 strikes a Canadian as eminently sensible.
This reaction arises, in part, because provincial and local taxes are not
deductible in Canada, and one tends to feel comfortable with a familiar
approach. It is, however, more than that. The rationale for the deductibility
of state and local taxes is simply very weak. Unless the taxes are incurred in
an income-producing activity, there is no compelling reason for a deduction;
indeed, if one were to design a new tax system for a federal country on a clean
slate, one would provide very limited deductibility. However, deductibility of
state and local taxes has a long history in the United States. The 1865 Act
provided that "all national, state, county, and municipal taxes paid within the
year"3 4 were deductible from the income of the payor. The ill-fated 1894 Act,
promptly ruled unconstitutional,35 also made national, state, county, school,
and municipal taxes deductible.3 6 After adoption of the sixteenth amendment
to the Constitution, permitting the federal government to levy income taxes,
Congress, in the Act of 1913, enacted basically the same personal deductions
as in the 1894 Act including the deduction for taxes.3 7 In fact, until
specifically prohibited in 1919,38 federal income tax paid in the current year
but levied on the previous year's income was deductible from the current
year's income.39 In 1943, federal excise taxes were removed from the list of
deductible taxes.40 In 1964, the deduction was ended for state and local
taxes on tobacco and alcoholic beverages, automobile and driver's licenses,
and other state and local selective excises, except gasoline taxes. 4' In 1979,
state and local taxes on the sale of gasoline, diesel fuel, and other motor fuels
33. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 78-83, and 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 62-65. The
President's Proposals would be effective as ofJanuary 1, 1986, rather than phasing in the deduction's
elimination over two years. THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS,
GROWTH, AND SIMPLICrrY 65 (1985) [hereinafter cited as the PRES. PROPOSALS].
34. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 78, § 1, 13 Stat. 469, 479 (amending the Revenue Act of 1864, ch.
172, § 117, 13 Stat. 218, 281).
35. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1894).
36. Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. 509, 553.
37. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § B, 38 Stat. 114, 167.
38. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 214(a)(3)(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1067 (1919).
39. The 1918 Code made all taxes deductible. Since then there has been a general narrowing,
leaving only specified taxes deductible.
40. Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, § 111, 58 Stat. 21, 34 (1944).
41. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 207, 78 Stat. 19, 40.
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were eliminated from the list of taxes for which there is an itemized
deduction.42
Although the deductibility of state and local taxes has a long history, it
appears that it was "casually granted at the outset" 43 and should certainly be
reexamined today. The Treasury notes that the deduction for state and local
taxes results in one of the most serious omissions from the income tax base.
Repeal of the deduction is projected to generate $33.9 billion in revenue for
198844 and to recoup approximately 32% of the revenue loss which the
proposed rate reduction will cause. 45 To justify keeping the deduction, one
would have to establish either that the deduction is required for the accurate
measurement of income or that it represents an efficient, fair, and necessary
subsidy to prevent the under-provision of state and local government services.
The Treasury concludes that the itemized deduction for state and local
taxes is not required for the accurate measurement of income.46 It argues
that many of the services provided by state and local government, such as
education, roads, and sanitary services, represent personal consumption
expenditures; allowing for a deduction for such expenditures would permit
taxpayers to finance personal consumption with pre-tax dollars, whereas
similar services acquired by private purchase must be paid with post-tax
dollars.47 The Treasury concedes that many benefits-such as police and fire
protection, judicial and administrative services, and public welfare or relief-
are not directly analogous to privately purchased goods or services. 48
Nevertheless, it contends that substantial personal benefit is derived by local
taxpayers from these services. These services are generally available to all on
the same basis, even though some individuals receive arguably greater benefit
than others. In addition, these services are analogous to those provided by
the federal government and yet no deduction is allowed for federal taxes.
The Treasury dismisses the argument that state and local taxes should be
deductible because they are a compulsory levy. It maintains that rates of
taxation are in a sense voluntary because they are controlled through the
electoral process. Recent state and local tax reduction initiatives emphasize
the potency of this process. The Treasury also indicates that state and local
taxpayers can "vote with their feet" by moving to jurisdictions which provide
a more personally satisfying combination of public services and taxes.49 Such
an option is not available at the national level and yet federal taxes are not
deductible.
42. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 11I(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2777.
43. Surrey, The Federal Income Base For Individuals, in 1 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH
CONG., 1ST SESS., 1 TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM 1, 10 (Comm. Print 1959) [hereinafter cited as the
TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM].
44. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 245. The President's Proposals estimate the recoupment
of $33.8 billion. PRES. PRoPosALs, supra note 33, at 63.
45. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 245.
46. Id. at 78.
47. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 62.
48. The President's Proposals also make this concession. PREs. PROPoSALS, supra note 33, at 64.
49. 2 TREAs. REPORT, supra note 1, at 63.
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The Treasury then assesses the view that the deduction for state and local
taxes is a subsidy that reduces the taxpayer's net cost of these taxes. It
concludes that there is no reason to believe that expenditures by state and
local governments have such strong spillover effects that they would be
greatly underprovided but for the federal subsidy.50 The Treasury believes
that it would be fairer, simpler, and more neutral to have state and local
government services financed from after-tax dollars.5' It will help to make
citizens more conscious of the cost of services provided by state and local
government.5 2 Current law discriminates against the alternative to across-
the-board taxes, that is, imposition of user charges, by making them
nondeductible.5 3 By eliminating this discrimination the proposal will facilitate
greater use of user charges in appropriate circumstances.
Having concluded that there is no necessity for a federal subsidy, the
Report emphasizes that the deduction for state and local taxes is neither an
efficient nor a fair subsidy. Since only itemizers receive the deduction benefit,
and itemizers represent only about one-third of all families, the Treasury
doubts that the subsidy significantly affects the level of state and local
government services.5 4 The Treasury contends that the subsidy is unfair both
within a state and between states.55 It is unfair because the federal
government only subsidizes state and local taxes of those who itemize, with
the highest subsidy going to those itemizers with the highest federal marginal
tax rates. In 1983, 95% of families with incomes over $100,000 itemized,
while among lower income families there were relatively few itemizers.5 6
Also, because income levels and state and local tax rates vary between states,
the federal government subsidizes a greater share of state and local
expenditures in high income, high tax states than in low income, low tax
states. Deductibility of state and local taxes thus results in a perverse pattern
of subsidy distributions both within states and between states. Moreover,
because the deduction causes higher federal tax rates for all taxpayers, there
is a net benefit only to itemizers and only for states and localities that levy
above average taxes.
Support for the deductibility of the various state and local taxes varies.
The property tax enjoys the least amount of support, with somewhat more
support for a general sales tax and substantially more support for the
deductibility of state and local income taxes. The case against deductibility of
the property tax is strong because it is perceived as a user charge analogous to
50. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 78. The President's Proposals reach the same conclusion.
PRES. PROPosALs, supra note 33, at 64.
51. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 63.
52. Id. at 80.
53. Id. at 64-65.
54. Id at 78. The President's Proposals also doubt the effect of the subsidy on state and local
government services. PRES. PROPosAL, supra note 33, at 65.
55. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 63. The President's Proposals also find the deduction
unfair to taxpayers within a state and to taxpayers in different states. PREs. PROPosALs, supra note 33,
at 63, 65.
56. 2 TREAs. REPORT, supra note 1, at 64.
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ordinary personal consumption. 57 In addition, the deductibility of property
taxes discriminates in favor of the homeowner and against the renter, thus
many regard the case against deductibility of property taxes as compelling. 58
Commentators also oppose the deduction of property taxes and general sales
taxes because these taxes are regressive, and are made more regressive
through a federal tax system that gives the greatest benefit to those who pay
the highest marginal rate of tax.5 9
Richard Goode, in disagreement with the Treasury Report, believes that
"the best balance between considerations of equity and intergovernmental
fiscal coordination would be struck by continuing the personal deduction for
state and local income taxes and broad sales and use taxes while eliminating it
for property taxes . ... "60 Goode thinks that by allowing deduction of both
income taxes and general sales taxes, the federal government would lessen
inhibitions on states' greater use of income taxation without exerting pressure
on the states to prefer income over sales taxes. 61
The Treasury recognizes that there are varying amounts of support for the
deductibility of the general sales tax, the personal income tax, and the
property tax but it rejects the view that itemized deductions should be
eliminated for some but retained for others. The reason is the widely
differing reliance on these three taxes among the states: five states do not levy
a general sales tax, six states do not have a personal income tax, and local
governments' reliance upon the property tax varies greatly.62 The Treasury
concludes that it would be unfair to residents of different states to allow some
but not other taxes to be deductible and would distort tax policy at state and
local levels. 63
The Treasury thus concludes that the itemized deduction for all state and
local taxes should be phased out. The deduction is not required for the
accurate measurement of taxpaying capacity, and it is neither an efficient nor
an equitable subsidy. To the extent that any subsidy is warranted, the
Treasury contends that direct federal outlays to state and local governments
would be more equitable and more cost effective.6 Elimination of this
itemized deduction will have no direct effect on the revenue of state and local
governments. 65 Indeed, the Treasury notes that because thirty-four state
income tax systems piggyback on the federal individual income tax base, and
57. See, e.g., Brazer, The Deductibility of State and Local Taxes Under the Individual Income Tax, in 1 TAx
REVISION COMPENDIUM, supra note 43, at 407, 415.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 414.
60. R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAx 170-71 (1976).
61. Id. at 171.
62. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 80.
63. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 65. The President's Proposals also use the unfairness and
distortion argument to support elimination of the deduction. PRES. PROPOSALS, supra note 33, at 65-
66.
64. 1 TEA.s. REPORT, supra note 1, at 78, 80.
65. It will have an indirect effect in that itemizers will be less willing to pay state and local taxes
and this will affect that sector's ability to raise revenues. See Noto & Zimmerman, Limiting State-Local
Tax Deductibility: Effects Among the States, 37 NAT'L TAxJ. 539, 540 (1984).
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because many of the forty-six states that levy corporate income taxes rely
upon the federal corporate tax measurement rules, the Treasury's base-
broadening proposals will permit substantial rate reduction by the states. 66
The Treasury is correct in contending that the deduction for state and
local income taxes is not required for accurate measurement of taxpaying
capacity. Such capacity is no more affected by income tax paid to a state or
local government than it is by income tax paid to the federal government.
There is no compelling reason to maintain either that state and local income
taxes must be deductible in determining taxable income for the federal
income tax or that federal income tax must be deductible in determining
taxable income for state and local income taxes. Each can use the same tax
base concurrently and make no allowance for the taxes paid to the other level
of government without departing from sound tax principles.
Federal deductibility of state income taxes does, however, protect
taxpayers against confiscatory taxation. From 1954 to 1963, the federal
marginal tax rate on taxable income in excess of $400,000 was 91%67 and one
of the highest state marginal tax rate was 10% in New York.68 With federal
deductibility, the combined marginal rate of tax on taxable income in excess
of $400,000 was not 101% but 91.9%.69 Confiscatory marginal tax rates can
also be prevented by state governments making the federal income tax
deductible. But confiscatory marginal tax rates are no longer a problem. The
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) reduced the top marginal rate
from 70% to 50%.70 The highest marginal state or local income tax rate is
now 16%.71 Thus, preventing confiscatory marginal tax rates is a dead issue,
particularly in light of the proposal to reduce the highest federal rate to 35%.
There are many in the United States who regard the deduction for state
and local income tax as a useful accommodation of federal-state
relationships. 72 There are others who believe that the superior taxing power
of the federal government should be used to reduce interstate tax differentials
and to allay fears of interstate migration of persons, businesses, and wealth. 73
Granting deductions from federal taxable income is not the appropriate way
to achieve these ends.
State taxpayers who itemize do not bear the full brunt of a state tax
increase but are able to pass some of it on to the federal government by
66. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 81.
67. J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 298 (3d ed. 1977).
68. Heller, Deductions and Credits for State Income Taxes, in 1 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM, supra note
43, at 419, 419-20.
69. On an additional $100, the state tax would be $10 and the federal tax would be 91% of
($100-$90) or $81.90 for a total of $91.90 or 91.9%.
70. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101, 95 Stat. 172, 176 (1981) (codified at I.R.C. § 1) (Lawyers Co-op.
1984).
71. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF
FISCAL FEDERALISM 60 (Table 47) (1984) [hereinafter cited as FISCAL FEDERALISM].
72. Due, Personal Deductions, in COMPEHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 37, 50-51 (J. Pechman ed.
1977).
73. R. GOODE, supra note 60, at 170.
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deducting those taxes in the calculation of federal taxable income. The
diminished federal tax revenue forces the federal government either to
increase taxes, decrease expenditures, or permit its deficit to grow. If
Congress raises taxes, a state that increases its taxes will export part of the tax
burden from the state to the national body of taxpayers. The burden is
shifted from the itemizers in a state that increases taxes to all other taxpayers
in the nation, including nonitemizers within that particular state. The
exportation of tax burden from a state will be relatively more successful 1) the
higher the proportion of taxpayers in the state who itemize, 2) the higher the
average income of the taxpayers in the state, and 3) the more the tax increase
is concentrated upon taxpayers having higher marginal federal income tax
rates. Thus, two states that levy the same average tax per taxpayer will realize
different federal tax subsidies. If everything else is equal, the federal subsidy
will be greater in the state with the more progressive state tax structure. The
federal deductibility of state and local taxes creates a bias in favor of the
income tax over sales and property taxes, and a bias in favor of a progressive
income tax over a proportional income tax.
I am sympathetic to the view that it is preferable for state and local
governments to obtain greater revenue from income taxation than from sales
or property taxes. There is a good deal of truth in Galbraith's thesis that in
the United States there is private affluence and public want.74 Galbraith
contends that there is a lack of balance between privately produced and
marketed goods and services, and publicly provided services. 75
Neoconservatives would, of course, deny the validity of Galbraith's private
opulence and public squalor thesis and are intent on further reducing the
level of government-provided public services. Although I regard the
neoconservatives as misguided, I cannot endorse a system that provides a
perverse pattern of federal subsidies running counter to the customary goal of
reducing interstate inequality of income.
Federal deductibility of state and local taxes is tantamount to a system of
state-initiated revenue sharing.76 Unfortunately, the ability of states to benefit
from this kind of revenue sharing differs widely. Throughout the nation,
33.4% of all taxpayers itemized in 1982, but the percentage varied from a low
of 17.7% in West Virginia to a high of 45% in Utah. 77 Average per capita
income for the nation in 1982 was $11,113, but this varied from a low of
$7,733 for Mississippi to a high of $16,854 for Alaska. 78 Federal tax saving
from the deductibility of state and local taxes has been estimated by states for
1984. The highest federal tax saving per capita occurred in New York ($263),
followed by Maryland ($211) and Massachusetts ($195); whereas the lowest
74. J. GAIBRArrH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 232-43 (3d ed. 1976).
75. Id. at 232.
76. See, e.g., Keller, The Case for Highly Graduated Rates in State Income Taxes, 35 MD. L. REV. 617(1976); Moscovitch, State Graduated Income Taxes-A State Initiated Form of Revenue Sharing, 25 NAT'L TAx
J. 53 (1972).
77. 2 TREAS, REPORT, supra note 1, at 67.
78. Id.
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saving occurred in South Dakota ($33) and Tennessee ($33), followed by
Louisiana ($34).79 Thus, the average per capita federal tax saving from the
deductibility of state and local taxes was eight times greater in New York than
it was in South Dakota and Tennessee. Mississippi with the lowest per capita
income of all the states obtained an average per capita federal tax saving of
$45, or only 17.1% of that of New York. The federal subsidy is greater for the
high tax states whose citizens have higher per capita income. This
distribution of the subsidy is not appropriate and thus the Treasury's proposal
to end the deductibility of state and local taxes has merit.
The federal government does have superior taxing power for the simple
reason that it levies taxes on the whole nation. As there is greater mobility
among the states than with other nations, states must be sensitive to the
problem of interstate migration of persons, wealth, and industry. Walter
Heller has described the cushioning or muting effect of interjurisdictional tax
differentials as the greatest strength of the federal deductibility of state and
local taxes, but he regards its distribution as its greatest weakness because
"the higher the income, the deeper the cushion." 80 In 1959, he proposed a
tax credit as a substitute for deductibility. 81 The deduction from federal tax
payable was to be equal to the lesser of the state and local income taxes paid
or 5% of the federal tax payable. This tax credit would be available to all
taxpayers whether itemizers or nonitemizers. Such a tax credit would
materially improve the distribution of benefits by income groups-increasing
the benefit to lower bracket taxpayers and diminishing the benefit to those in
the higher bracket. The credit would also reduce substantially the perverse
pattern of federal tax subsidies among the states currently produced by the
deductibility of state and local taxes. The net effect of substituting a flat 5%
credit for the deductibility of state and local taxes would be a shift in the
federal subsidy from the wealthier to the poorer states.
Walter Heller noted that a flat credit with a cap equal to 5% or even 10%
of the federal tax payable "would not remove the interstate competition
threat entirely, but it would put a substantial noncompetitive floor under State
income taxes and reduce the struggle for competitive advantage which has
retarded the use of the outstanding growth tax in the State revenue system." 82
One of the difficulties with this proposed credit is that the six states which do
not levy an income tax and the three states with a very limited income tax
would be coerced or strongly induced to impose a personal income tax
sufficient to absorb the federal credit. But if the case for state taxation of
income is strong, federal inducement to levy an income tax should not be
required.
79. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STRENGTHENING THE FEDERAL
REVENUE SYSTEM: IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE AND LOCAL TAXING AND BORROWING, inside back cover
(1984) [hereinafter cited as IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE AND LOCAL TAXING].
80. Heller, supra note 68, at 422.
81. Id. at 423-27.
82. Id at 425.
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An inducment to levy a state income tax would also run counter to current
public opinion. In a survey which asked: "Suppose your state government
must raise taxes substantially, which would be a better way to do it?," 57%
replied state sales tax, 23% replied state individual income tax, and 20%
responded "don't know." 83 Even though public opinion may be misguided,
tax reformers might be unwise to induce a tax change which runs counter to
current opinion. It should also be recognized that the general stimulus to
state and local tax increases and spending caused by the current deductibility
of state and local taxes conflicts with the post-Proposition thirteen world in
which nineteen states have state-level and forty-one states have local-level tax
or expenditure limits.8 4
In addition to proposals that would eliminate deductibility of one or all of
the currently deductible state and local taxes, a number of suggestions have
been made to restrict deductibility. One proposal would make state and local
taxes deductible only to the extent that tax payments exceed a floor set as a
percentage of adjusted gross income. A second proposal would make state
and local taxes deductible only up to a ceiling set as a percentage of adjusted
gross income. A third proposal would disallow a percentage of currently
deductible tax payments. Noto and Zimmerman conclude that if state and
local tax deductibility is to be limited, their preferred method is to limit
deductibility to state and local taxes that exceed a floor set as a percentage of
adjusted gross income.8 5 Their preference is based on two criteria, one of
which is interstate equity-the limitation should be evenhanded in allocating
increased federal tax liability among itemizers in all states.8 6 However, if the
present federal tax subsidy is distributionally perverse, precisely what one
does not want is an evenhanded allocation of the increased federal tax
liability. In any case, there is more reason to be concerned about the total
distributional impact of all the proposed tax changes than about. the
distributional impact on individuals flowing from one tax change.
The Treasury proposal to phase out the deductibility of all state and local
taxes is warranted. This change would make the tax systems of the United
States and Canada more similar. If a Canadian province or local government
increases its taxes, the taxpayer bears the full brunt of the tax increase. If
state and local taxes are made nondeductible, the same would be true in the
United States. However, in Canada there will be a small secondary effect
flowing from the increase in provincial taxes. Since 1957, equalization
payments have been paid by the Canadian federal government to the poorer
provinces so that they will have sufficient revenue to provide comparable
levels of public service at reasonably comparable levels of taxation. The
current Canadian formula for calculating equalization payments is based on
83. FISCAL FEDERALISM, supra note 71, at 91.
84. IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE AND LOCAL TAXING, supra note 79, at 38.
85. Noto & Zimmerman, supra note 65, at 546.
86. Id. at 546-47. The second criterion is the response of state and local government's own-
source tax revenue to the proposals. Id.
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the concept of a national average rate of tax determined for each of thirty-
three revenue sources of the provinces . 7 The per capita yield for each
revenue source is determined for each province by applying the national
average tax rate to that province's own tax base and then dividing that
hypothetical tax revenue by the province's population. The per capita yield
from each revenue source for each province is compared with the average per
capita yield in the five provinces constituting the standard. 8 The per capita
deficiency or excess for all thirty-three sources is aggregated and a province
with a net per capita deficiency will be entitled to an equalization grant equal
to its net per capita deficiency multiplied by its own population. Thus, in
Canada, when provinces increase their rates of taxation, the national average
tax rate will be increased with the result that equalization payments will be
increased to provinces whose tax capacity is lower than the five-province
standard. This may cause the federal government to increase its level of
taxation to finance the increased equalization payments. Section 36(2) of
Canada's new Constitution recognizes this commitment to the principle of
equalization.8 9
In the United States, the same commitment to the principle of equalization
is not found. Yet the need for such equalization is as great, if not greater, in
the United States as in Canada. A reasonable first approximation of a state's
fiscal capacity is given by its per capita income. There is even wider
divergence between states with the highest and lowest average per capita
income in the United States as compared with the divergence between
Canadian provinces. 90 There has been a dramatic growth, particularly in the
last decade, in the United States' federal grants to state and local
87. CANADIAN TAX FOUNDATION, THE NATIONAL FINANCES 1982-83, at 173-75 (1983).
88. The five provinces are British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, and Saskatchewan. Id.
at 174.
89. Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, pt. III, § 36(2), 1980-1983 Can. Stat. iii, xiii-xiv states:
Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the principle of making equalization
payments to ensure that provincial governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably
comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation."
90. TABLE 1
PERSONAL INCOME PER CAPITA, 1983
United States $11,675 % Canada $13,541 0
Alaska $16,812 144 Ont. 14,784 109
Conn. 14,826 127 Alta. 14,652 108
N.J. 14,057 120 B.C. 14,339 106
Cal. 13,239 113 Sask. 12,686 94
N.Y. 13,146 113 Man. 12,603 93
Ark. 9,040 77 Que. 12,531 93
Utah 9,031 77 N.S. 10,889 80
S.C. 8,954 77 P.E.I. 10,056 74
W. Va. 8,937 77 N.B. 10,040 74
Miss. 8,072 69 Nfld. 9,179 68
Source: U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1985, at 440 (Table 731) (1984); STATISTICS CANADA, NATIONAL
INCOME AND EXPENDITURES ACCOUNTS, 1969-1983, at 46-47 (Table 36) (1984).
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government. 9' There are many categorical grants and block grants. In 1972,
general revenue sharing was introduced to provide unrestricted and
nonmatching grants to state and local governments. 92 Professors Richard and
Peggy Musgrave have concluded that: "General revenue sharing is an
effective means of transferring tax burden from the state-local to the federal
revenue system, but it has not been of major importance in equalizing fiscal
capacity and need."9 3 They also conclude that "traditional categorical grants
have not been effective as a means of fiscal equalization." 94 The Musgraves
are not disturbed by the very limited amount of equalization achieved through
federal grants, however. They believe that a grant distribution inversely
related to a state's per capita income is not an effective approach because high
income states frequently contain low income jurisdictions and intrastate
differentials in fiscal capacity are greater than interstate differentials. 95 The
response to this argument would seem to be that a high income state
containing low income pockets has, within itself, the fiscal capacity to provide
all its citizens with adequate governmental services. The low income state,
however, without equalization grants from the federal government, will be
powerless to provide adequate government services to its citizens unless it is
prepared to impose unduly high levels of taxation.
In 1982, among all the states, Mississippi had the lowest per capita income
($7,733) and Connecticut had the second highest ($13,939), more than 80%
higher than Mississippi. 96 The fiscal capacity of Mississippi is thus much less
than that of Connecticut and one would expect that governmental
expenditures on services in Mississippi would be much lower than in
Connecticut. For example, in 1981-82, the current expenditure per pupil in
average daily attendance in public elementary and secondary schools was
$1,706 in Mississippi and $3,189 in Connecticut, or 86.9% higher than in
Mississippi. 97 The percentage of the population having completed one to
three years of high school in Connecticut is 83.7% but only 73% in
Mississippi; the percentage of the population having completed one to three
years of college is 35.9% in Connecticut and 25.6% in Mississippi. 98 The
infant mortality rates per thousand live births is 19.1 and 10.2 respectively for
the black and white populations of Connecticut, but is 23.7 and 11.1 in
91. R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 552-54 (3d ed.
1980).
92. Id. at 558-59.
93. Id. at 566.
94. Id.
95. Id
96. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 67. The reason I have compared Mississippi, the state with
the lowest per capita income, with Connecticut, the state with the second highest per capita income,
rather than with Alaska which has the highest per capita income, is that the cost of living is
substantially higher in Alaska and this would distort the comparison.
97. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION: 1984 EDITION 40 (Table 1.14)
(1985).
98. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1984, at 145 (1983) (statistics from 1980).
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Mississippi. 99 Thus, Mississippi's infant mortality rate for blacks is 24%
higher than Connecticut's and is 8.8% higher for whites. There can be little
doubt that the ability of Mississippi to provide governmental services for its
citizens is substantially less than that of Connecticut. Equalization payments
from the federal government would seem to be necessary for lower income
states such as Mississippi.
Professor Kenneth Dam has stated that:
[T]hey [state and local governments] continue to pursue widely different expenditure
policies in such basic areas as education and transportation, and there has been no
serious attempt to equalize revenues among the states. Whatever the state of health of
federalism generally, fiscal federalism is still very much alive.10
0
To a Canadian, equating the lack of any serious attempt to equalize fiscal
capacities of the states with vigorous fiscal federalism seems peculiar. If fiscal
capacities were equalized, a state would still be able to pursue widely different
expenditure policies but would be able to provide an average standard of
governmental service with only an average level of taxation should the state
choose to do so. The lack of a serious commitment to equalization would be
regarded by most Canadians, not as an affirmation of fiscal federalism, but as
a denial of the rights of all citizens to comparable levels of governmental
service at comparable levels of taxation.
The Treasury's proposal to phase out the deduction of state and local
taxes is appropriate because the current deduction magnifies rather than
reduces the difference in the fiscal capacities of the states. The President, in
his 1986 Budget, has proposed the elimination of general revenue sharing.' 10
A preferable policy might be to continue general revenue sharing after it has
been wholly revamped to achieve greater equalization of the fiscal capacities
of the states.
B. Termination of the Alternative Minimum Tax
The Treasury Department proposes to abolish the alternative minimum
tax. This is particularly interesting for Canada because in last year's federal
election all three major political parties advocated some form of minimum
tax. The United States' alternative minimum tax was originally enacted as
part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969.102 It was considered necessary because
"many individuals and corporations did not pay tax on a substantial part of
their economic income as a result of the receipt of various kinds of tax-favored
income or special deductions."'' 03 The Treasury notes that the existence of a
minimum tax reflects an ambivalence about the tax preferences which are
made liable to the minimum tax. It also reveals significant skepticism about
99. Id at 77 (statistics from 1980).
100. Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 320 (1977).
101. ExEcUTrIvE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 1986, at 5-151 (1985).
102. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 301, 83 Stat. 487, 580-86 (1969).
103. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 113.
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the fairness and efficiency of tax preferences, as well as about the justification
for the higher tax rates to offset revenue loss. 104
A tax system which offers taxpayers a rich smorgasbord of tax preferences
is bound to create problems, for it results in the abandonment of horizontal
equity. Taxpayers with the same economic income are taxed at greatly
differing rates. Those earning the bulk of their income from nonpreferred
activities pay higher taxes than others whose economic income is the same but
is received in the form of capital gains or income from real estate or natural
resources that benefit from tax preferences. There is really only one
satisfactory approach to the present tax preference smorgasbord-eliminating
virtually all of them. Tax should be levied on a comprehensive income tax
base. This was the message of Canada's Carter Report, and it is also the
verdict of the Treasury Report. The Treasury Department seeks to redefine
the income tax base so as to approximate more closely economic income and
concludes that, if its proposals were fully implemented, the alternative
minimum tax would be unnecessary. It suggests that this tax be repealed for
taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1990, but only if its base-
broadening proposals are accepted. 0 5 The Treasury notes that between
100,000 and 200,000 individuals are currently subject to the flat 20%
minimum tax, but that several million taxpayers become involved in the
complexity of the alternative minimum tax because they must make
calculations in order to determine whether they are liable.106
The alternative minimum tax is a very poor second-best approach to the
equity problem posed by current tax preferences. It is really an admission of
failure-an admission that Congress or Parliament cannot withstand the heat
that would be generated by tax lobbyists who would oppose a truly
comprehensive income tax base. In my opinion, Canada should hesitate
before making such an admission. Canada should decline to follow the
American example of a minimum tax, particularly now that the U.S. Treasury
Department doubts the wisdom of this approach and is advocating its repeal.
The fact that some taxpayers overindulge themselves at the tax preference
smorgasbord, and as a result pay little or no tax, is indeed a serious problem
which must be addressed. 10 7
104. Id. at 114.
105. Id.; 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 130. The President's Proposals retain the alternative
minimum tax of 20%. Alternate minimum taxable income would be the sum of adjusted gross
income and preference items in excess of $10,000 ($5,000 for married persons filing separately) and
subtracting certain deductions and exemptions. PRES. PROPOSALS, supra note 33, at 330. Thirteen
preference items are listed. Id. at 330-32.
106. TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 114. The President's Proposals address this concern by
excluding the taxpayer's first $10,000 of preferences from the alternative minimum tax, thus "only
individuals using substantial amounts of the preferences would need to compute the minimum tax."
PREs. PaoPosAms, supra note 33, at 332.
107. In 1981, of the 5,800 Canadians who had incomes in excess of $250,000, 239 paid no
income tax. These 239 individuals had an average income of $615,305; this should be compared to
an average income of $442,301 for the 5,561 Canadians who paid an average of $133,528 in tax. See
CANADA DEP'T OF SUPPLY & SERVICES, 1983 TAXATION STATISTICS 59, 81 (1983).
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The Minister of Finance, Michael Wilson, in an address to the Canadian
Tax Foundation, recognized that respect for the tax system was being
undermined because the system permits a significant number of high income
Canadians to pay either no, or unacceptably little, personal income tax.' 0 8 He
acknowledged that the reason for this was the growing range of tax incentives
introduced over the years. Individually, these incentives were defended as
having "served useful and beneficial economic and social ends,"' 0 9 but their
combined impact he regarded as another question, one which has aroused
public concern.
The Finance Minister suggested two broad approaches to the problem, a
targeted and a comprehensive approach. 110 Under the targeted approach,
limits would be placed on specific tax provisions most heavily used by high
income persons to avoid paying tax. Because a limited range of tax incentives
account for a very large proportion of nontaxable returns of high income
individuals, targeted restrictions would appear to be warranted. This
approach, according to the Minister, poses two problems."' The first is that
targeted restrictions might just stimulate greater use of other nonrestricted
tax preferences, which would generate a call for another round of specific
limitations in a few years' time. The second problem is that this approach
does not address the preferences' combined impact which permits high
income persons to avoid paying their fair share of income tax. This problem
suggests the second approach, which is to define income more
comprehensively for the purpose of levying a minimum tax. The chief
difficulty with this approach is the complexity involved in redefining the
income base for such a minimum tax. Achieving a comprehensive and refined
measure of income would be tantamount to rewriting the Income Tax Act.
Achieving fairness without undermining the incentives for investment and
without unduly complicating tax returns for all Canadians is indeed a
challenge. However, calling it a challenge suggests that there is a satisfactory
solution. It might be better to call it a dilemma, for neither a targeted nor a
comprehensive approach constitutes an adequate response. A much more
fundamental approach to this conundrum seems to be required. I believe that
the Minister senses that this is the case, for he has questioned whether "the
goal of economic growth would be better served by fewer rather than more
industrial incentives."' 2 The adoption of a comprehensive and neutral tax
system might not only promote economic growth by permitting market forces
to direct resources to their most productive uses freed from tax distortions,
but might also enhance horizontal equity and restore taxpayer confidence in
the integrity of the income tax system. The minimum tax is but a very
108. Address by the Honorable Michael Wilson, Minister of Finance, to the Canadian Tax
Foundation, in Toronto, Canada, at 8 (November 28, 1984) (Press Release of the Canada
Department of Finance).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 9.
111. Id at 9.
112. Id at 4.
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inadequate palliative. Moreover, a flat rate minimum tax has no legitimate
place in an equitable and progressive income tax structure whether the
highest marginal tax rate is 50% or the 35% advocated in the Treasury
Report. Both the United States Congress and the Canadian Parliament
should have the gumption to redefine the income tax base so that it comes to
resemble the Haig-Simons definition of income much more closely.
The Treasury Report notes that "[t]ax reform has often-and long-been
held hostage by failure to deal with transitional issues . . l"113 The
Treasury has suggested a number of mechanisms that will ease the impact of
windfall gains and losses and of economic dislocation that is an unavoidable
concomitant of tax reform and will enhance the political feasibility of reform
so as to promote a fair and orderly transition. These include postponement
of the effective date of the tax change, phasing in the change over time, and
grandfathering income from certain assets so that the new provisions apply
only to new purchasers. 114
The Report does not acknowledge that the minimum tax might be the
most suitable mechanism to facilitate the transition from a narrow-based to a
broad-based income tax. This mechanism would involve setting up a second
tax system to parallel the existing system.'l 5 The minimum tax would be
levied on a new comprehensive income base, and a taxpayer would be
required to pay whichever income tax amount is greater, computed either by
the existing or the minimum tax system. To minimize the disruptive impact of
fundamental tax reform upon persons who have made investments or
otherwise relied upon existing tax concessions, the minimum tax could be
phased in gradually. For example, if a three-bracket system with rates of 15%,
25%, and 35% were considered appropriate for a comprehensive income tax
system, the initial rate structure for the minimum tax might be 1.5%, 2.5%,
and 3.5%. Over a period of ten years, the initial rates could be increased in
equal annual increments of 1.5%, 2.5%, and 3.5% until the desired schedule
of 15%, 25%, and 35% was achieved. As the rate schedule for the minimum
tax is gradually increased, more and more taxpayers would begin to pay the
minimum tax, and the additional tax revenue so derived would permit the rate
structure of the original tax system to be reduced. Thus, over a period of ten
years, all taxpayers could pay the minimum tax levied on a comprehensive
income tax base, and the original tax system could be abandoned. The
minimum tax as a transitional mechanism probably merits consideration for
only a truly comprehensive tax reform agenda which includes taxing of
interest on all state and local government bonds and making mortgage
interest on homes nondeductible. For the kind of reform it proposed, the
Treasury's transitional provisions are probably adequate.
113. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 19.
114. Id. at 20.
115. Richard D. Hobbet proposed the minimum tax as a mode of facilitating tax reform in
Transitional Mechanisms to Facilitate Tax Reform, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 818 (1969); see also Graez,
The 1982 Minimum TaxAmendments As a First Step in the Transition to a "Flat-rate" Tax, 56 S. CAL. L. Rv.
527 (1983).
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C. Inflation-Proofing of the Tax System
Another aspect of the Treasury proposal of great interest to Canadians is
the "inflation-proofing" of the income tax system and the centrality accorded
to it. This is one significant way in which the Treasury proposal and the
Carter Report differ. The Carter Report was adamantly opposed to any
automatic adjustment for inflation, whether dealing with the mismeasurement
of tax liability caused by bracket creep or the mismeasurement of income itself
caused by treating historical dollars as equivalent to current dollars." 6 The
Carter Report was somewhat crudely characterized by the expression-a buck
is a buck is a buck. While the Treasury Report also generally endorses this
approach, it emphasizes that inflation causes dollars of different time periods
to have different purchasing power and that a fair income tax system must
address this problem.' 17
It should be recognized that the Carter Royal Commission was examining
Canada's tax system in the mid-1960's, at a time when the rate of inflation was
projected to be between 1.5% and 2% per year."" At the time, minimizing
the cumulative effect of such a relatively mild rate of inflation seemed
reasonable, as was concluding that concern about taxing illusory gains was
being overemphasized. The commissioners also concluded that
comprehensive inflation adjustment would be extremely complex and that it
would be inappropriate to relieve only some groups from the impact of
inflation. 119 The commissioners further believed that indexation of the tax
system would be a serious error because it "would impair the power of the tax
system to stabilize the economy."' 20 Henry Simons, the intellectual father of
the Carter Report,' 2 ' had concluded that "any attempt to allow systematically
for monetary instability in the measurement of taxable income seems
altogether inexpedient .... 122 It was therefore to be expected that
inflation-proofing the tax system would be omitted from the tax reform
agenda at that time.
Inflation has been viewed as a much more serious problem with the
extended inflationary period during the late 1970's and the early 1980's. In
spite of substantially higher nominal interest rates, some investors
experienced negative real after-tax rates of return. The lack of indexation of
the tax base means that inflation imposes a surtax on investment income at
the same various rates now applicable to those investments-ordinary rates
116. 2 CARTER REPORT, supra note 8, at 32-34.
117. See 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 6. The President proposes indexation of the earned
income credit, PRES. PROPOSALS, supra note 33, at 17-18; depreciable assets, id. at 132-59; inventory,
id at 174-78; and capital gains (starting in 1991, at the option of the individual taxpayer), i at 164-
73.
118. 2 CARTER REPORT, supra note 8, at 32.
119. Id. at 33.
120. Id at 47.
121. The intellectual debt owed to Henry Simons by the Royal Commission was acknowledged
by its chairman, Kenneth LeM. Carter, in an article entitled Canadian Tax Reform and Henry Simons, 11
J.L. & ECON. 231 (1968).
122. H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 206 (1938).
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on bonds, the preferential rate on realized long-term capital gains, and at a
zero rate on unrealized capital gains. The nonneutral taxation of business
income across assets and industries is capriciously distorted by inflation, with
the result that business planning becomes even more uncertain. Full
deductibility by the borrower of the high nominal interest payments during
periods of inflation greatly enhances the opportunity for tax arbitrage--the
process of borrowing to purchase tax-preferred assets. There is a growing
realization that tax arbitrage may well be the most critical tax reform issue
facing us today. 123
Piously hoping for price stability is no longer an adequate response to the
problem that inflation poses for a fair income tax system. Inflation increases
the distortions caused by the current tax system. Full indexation of the tax
system was previously opposed because it was thought that the automatic
economic stabilizing effect of the income tax system would be seriously
impaired. It is now recognized that even with full indexation there would be
significant adjustment lags and that the automatic stabilizing effect of an
indexed tax system compared with a nonindexed system would not be
significantly different and should not deter the adoption of an indexed tax
system. 124 It seems appropriate, therefore, that the Treasury Report should
set as its goal a much more comprehensive income tax system which would be
largely inflation-proof.
Inflation may distort the determination of income tax liability in two main
ways: bracket creep, which affects all kinds of income; and incorrect
measurement of investment and business income, which affects only income
from capital. Canada, since 1974,125 and the United States, since 1985,126
have removed the problem of bracket creep through indexation of personal
exemptions and tax brackets. Taxpayers whose nominal income merely
increases by the rate of inflation will no longer find their after-tax real income
diminished. Inflation will neither erode the value of their personal
exemptions nor narrow the width of tax brackets. Indexing of the rate
structure has a further advantage over periodic ad hoc adjustment, for it
compels legislators to vote openly for tax increases and ends the "practice of
palming off discretionary adjustments to counter-balance inflation as 'tax
cuts.' "127 Without indexation, the larger a taxpayer's personal exemption
entitlement, the greater was his exposure to inflation induced tax increases.
Thus, the larger the number of one's dependants, the greater was the inflation
induced tax increases, "a result that would be sensible only were it assumed
123. Steuerle, Tax Arbitrage, Inflation, and the Taxation of Interest Payments and Receipts, 30 WAYNE L.
REV. 991, 1009 (1984).
124. H. AARON, INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX 313-14 (1976).
125. Ch. 30, § 15, 1973-1974 Can. Stat. 441, 452-55 § 117.1 (adding to the Income Tax Act).
126. I.R.C. § 1(f) (Lawyers Co-op. 1984). This provision is closely modelled after the Canadian
section 117.1 even to the selection of September 30 for comparing the Consumer Price Index. See
Income Tax Act, ch. 140, § 76(3), 1980-1983 Can. Stat. 3777, 3955-56.
127. Rosenn, Adjusting of Business Income for Inflation: Lessons from Brazil and Chile, 13 TEx. INT'L
L.J. 165, 195 (1978).
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that families with children had their relative spending power improved in
periods of general price inflation."' 12 Indexing cures such problems.
Indexing the rate structure is not as important as the inflation adjustments
necessary to prevent the mismeasurement of business and capital income.
Periodic adjustment of personal exemptions and of the rate structure can
achieve results comparable to those of indexing but cannot correct for income
mismeasurement. Even so, since indexing the rate structure can be achieved
with comparative ease, it is not surprising that it precedes the more difficult
task of preventing inflation from causing mismeasurement of capital income.
Although indexing the rate structure only begins this year in the United
States, the Treasury Report says that it "should remain an inviolate part of the
tax system."' 1 9 In Canada, there may be some doubt that such indexing has
become "an inviolate part" of its tax system. The 1981 budget placed a 6%
indexation cap on inflation adjustment for 1982, followed by a 5% cap for
1983.130 An Advisory Committee Report to the Minister of Finance (the
Lortie Report) criticized the two-year limitation upon full indexation of
personal exemptions and tax brackets because it gave "conflicting and
confusing signals about the extent of the government's commitment to
removing the effects of inflation."'' The temporary retreat from full
indexation of the rate structure can only be partially justified as a means of
breaking the inflation psychology taking root. Professor Gillespie perceives a
shrewd and politically sensitive attempt by the Department of Finance and the
government to eliminate the rate structure indexation in the 1981 budget.'3 2
While his hypothesis that "the government used the 1981 budget proposals as
a strategic device to divert opposition from the eventual de-indexing
reform"' 33 is not convincing, neither the Canadian government nor the
Department of Finance has issued a ringing declaration proclaiming rate
structure indexation an "inviolate part of the tax system" as has the Treasury
Department. 13 4
Canada, like most other nations, has made no comprehensive or
systematic effort to correct the mismeasurement of capital income caused by
inflation. The Department of Finance has taken the position that
comprehensive corrections for all the tax-related effects of inflation would not
128. Bossons & Wilson, Adjusting Tax Rates for Inflation, 21 CANADIAN TAXJ. 185, 188 (1973).
129. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 17.
130. Income Tax Act, ch. 140, § 76(3), 1980-1983 Can. Stat. 3777, 3955-56 (adding subsection
117.1 (7.1)).
131. CANADA, DEP'T OF SUPPLY & SERVICES, REPORT OF THE MINISTERIAL ADVISORY COMM ITEE
ON INFLATION AND THE TAXATION OF PERSONAL INVESTMENT INCOME 10 (1982) [hereinafter cited as the
LORTIE REPORT].
132. Gillespie, The 1981 Federal Budget: Muddling Through or Purposeful Tax Reform?, 31 CANADIAN
TAxJ. 975, 984-87 (1983).
133. Id at 988.
134. The budget of May 23, 1985 will greatly curtail indexation of personal exemptions and tax
brackets in Canada. Adjustments will only be made to the extent that the annual increase in the
consumer price index exceeds three percent. CANADA, DEP'T OF FINANCE, BUDGET PAPERS-SECURING
ECONOMIC RENEWAL 73 (1985).
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be feasible at the present. 3 5 The Lortie Report questioned whether it was
feasible for Canada alone to implement an inflation corrected system for the
taxation of business income, given the close integration of the Canadian and
American economy.' 3 6 Seeing the U.S. Treasury propose comprehensive
measures to correct the mismeasurement of income from capital caused by
inflation is therefore encouraging. This will encourage Canadians to do the
same, for Canada will no longer have to fear being out of step with what is
done in the United States. The Treasury's advocacy of a comprehensive
approach is also to be lauded because Canadian and American experiences
with ad hoc measures to minimize the impact of inflation have not been
happy. The $1,000 deduction for investment income of individuals, the two-
year write-off for manufacturing and processing equipment, the investment
tax credit, the 3% inventory allowance and the Indexed Security Investment
Plan do not represent a satisfactory Canadian response to the problem of
inflation.' 3 7
Inflation results in a mismeasurement of income whenever dollars of
different time periods are treated as equivalent. If two capital assets, A and B,
were each acquired for $1,000 and were each sold for $2,000, but A was
purchased twenty years ago and B was purchased last year, it is immediately
apparent that the equal nominal gain of $1,000 realized on each asset bears
little real relationship to each other. In an inflationary world, it is also true
that sales revenue of $100 on January 1 is not an exact equivalent of sales
revenue of $100 on December 31 of the same year. Nevertheless, the
significant distortion flowing from inflation occurs through treating dollars of
a different year as equivalent to current dollars. The major distortions are
generally considered to occur in the following four specific areas:
1. Capital Gains-Proceeds of disposition are expressed in current dollars but the
basis is expressed in historical dollars. Gains in nominal terms are therefore larger
than real gains which can be negative and losses in nominal terms understate real
losses.
2. Depreciation-Depreciation claims are based on historical costs but the
revenues against which the assets are written off are measured in current dollars.
Depreciation, in the absence of investment incentives, is therefore understated in real
terms.
3. Inventory-Where the first goods put into inventory are considered the first
out (FIFO), the deduction for cost of goods used or sold is based on lower prices that
prevailed earlier. If cost of goods is understated, profit is overstated.
4. Debt-Debt is denominated in historical dollars and is repaid in current
dollars. The creditor suffers a loss in real terms and the debtor has an identical real
gain. Also all interest receipts or payments are taxed as income or are deducted from
income even though a substantial portion may represent an inflation adjustment.
135. LORTIE REPORT, supra note 131, at 43.
136. Id. at 43-44.
137. These adjustments for inflation are unsatisfactory because they are only partial measures
when overall adjustment is required. The budget presented on May 23, 1985 proposed to repeal the
indexed security investment plan as of January 1, 1986. CANADA, DEP'T OF FINANCE, BUDGET
PAPERS-SECURING ECONOMIC RENEWAL 5 (1985).
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The Treasury proposal dealing with each of these four areas will be
described briefly and discussed under the same four headings.
1. Capital Gains. The Treasury proposes that the cost basis of capital assets
be indexed for inflation to avoid taxing nominal gains that merely reflect
inflation, 38 and that real capital gains be taxed as ordinary income when
realized.' 3 9 The Treasury notes that the current exclusion of 60% of long-
term nominal capital gains is an exceedingly inaccurate mode of adjusting for
inflation.' 40 With high rates of inflation and a long holding period, the
exclusion is inadequate; and with low rates of inflation and a short holding
period, the exclusion is far too generous.
For property other than inventory or debt instruments, a taxpayer's
original cost basis would be indexed for inflation during the holding
period. 141 An asset would have to be held for one full calendar quarter in
order to qualify for indexing. 42 The Internal Revenue Service proposes to
publish inflation tables based upon the Consumer Price Index for Urban
Households which would specify the inflation adjustment factor to be applied
to the original cost basis to determine the inflation-adjusted basis.' 43 A
taxpayer, knowing the quarter of the year in which the asset was purchased as
well as the quarter of the year in which the asset was sold, would locate a
single inflation adjustment factor. These factors would be computed by the
Internal Revenue Service using a half-quarterly convention, which would
allow only half the applicable quarterly inflation rate regardless of when an
asset was acquired or sold during the quarter. 144
The tables would contain inflation adjustment factors back to the first
quarter of 1965.145 Assets acquired before 1965 would be indexed as if
acquired on January 1, 1965. The Treasury obviously wishes to limit the size
of the table of inflation adjustment factors, pointing out that 84% of the
inflation during the postwar period has occurred since 1965.146 A person
acquiring an asset prior to 1965 may be somewhat annoyed to be informed
that he is entitled only to inflation adjustment commencing in 1965 because
the Treasury wanted a smaller adjustment table. Nevertheless, when the
Treasury is proposing full inclusion of real capital gains in the income tax
base, prejudicing this proposal by relatively petty administrative concerns is
probably unwise.
138. 2 TREAs. REPORT, supra note 1, at 178-88.
139. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 100-105. The President's Proposals would retain a
preferential capital gains rate, although reducing the exclusion from 60% to 50%. PRES. PROPOSALS,
supra note 33, at 164-73. Only individual taxpayers would have the option of indexing capital gains
beginning in 1991 in lieu of the preferential tax rate. Md. at 169.
140. 1 TREAs. REPORT, supra note 1, at 100-01; 2 TREAs. REPORT, supra note 1, at 180.
141. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 181.




146. 1 TREAs. REPORT, supra note 1, at 101.
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During the three-year transitional period a taxpayer will be entitled to a
one-time marked-to-market election 147 so that he may determine whether
current preferential treatment from an unindexed basis is more advantageous
than full taxation from an indexed historic basis, limited to post-1964
inflation.' 48 This option, however, would be limited to readily marketable
assets. Homeowners would not benefit from the marked-to-market election.
Currently, homeowners who are age fifty-five or older are entitled to exclude
permanently the first $125,000 of nominal gain on the sale of a principal
residence. 49 One of the reasons for the large current exclusion is that much
of the gain represents inflation. The Treasury proposes that the first
$125,000 of real, rather than nominal, gain on such sales be exempted. 150
Deciding to tax only real capital gains means that the exclusion could have
been eliminated or substantially reduced. By not reducing the exclusion, the
Treasury proposal would give homeowners who acquired their homes prior to
1965 a rough and very generous offset for limiting the adjustment to post-
1964 inflation and for not making the marked-to-market election available to
them. For persons who acquired their homes since 1965, the exclusion would
be a large additional tax preference. Since homeowners would continue to
deduct nominal mortgage interest, the additional tax preference for
homeowners does not seem warranted.
The proposals to abolish the preferential treatment of capital gains and to
introduce indexation mean that the top tax rate on real capital gains would be
35% as compared with the present 20% on nominal long-term gains, due to
the 60% exclusion rule and the current top marginal rate of 50%. Whether
an individual taxpayer will pay more or less tax will depend on the rate of
inflation and the holding period. What is certain is that the proposed system
is a better and fairer income tax.
The Treasury proposal would eliminate the current volatility in effective
tax rates on capital gains caused by changes in the rate of inflation. The
accurate measurement of real losses would mean an associated increase in
government risk-sharing that should encourage saving and investment.
Taxing real capital gains as ordinary income would eliminate much
complexity and uncertainty in the current law. The scope for disputes
between taxpayers and the government is greatly restricted by repeal of the
preferential treatment of capital gains. For example, tax planning schemes
designed to convert ordinary income to capital gains would be deprived of
their motivation. Depreciation recapture rules would not be necessary
147. A marked-to-market election permits a taxpayer to recognize a capital gain without the
need for a realization. The taxpayer who opts for a marked-to-market election will have a new basis
for his capital asset equal to its fair market value at the time of the election.
148. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 184.
149. I.R.C. § 121 (Lawyers Co-op. 1984).
150. 2 TREAs. REPORT, supra note 1, at 186. The President's Proposals would also exclude the
first $125,000 of inflation-adjusted gain from the sale of a principal residence. PREs. PROPOSALS,
supra note 33, at 169.
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because there is no need to distinguish between depreciation recapture and a
capital gain when both are fully included in income.
One disappointing feature of the proposal, however, is that losses from the
sales of investment property would remain subject to the current limitations
on capital losses and thus the amount of tax simplification is significantly
reduced. 15' Losses from sales of investment property-generally all
nonpersonal use property not used in a trade or business-would offset gains
from such property, with any excess loss deductible up to a maximum of
$3,000 per year for a noncorporate taxpayer.' 52 Excess investment property
losses could be carried forward indefinitely by both individuals and
corporations. There is no suggestion that the maximum excess loss of $3,000
deductible from other income by noncorporate taxpayers should be indexed.
No proposal is made to index excess investment property losses. But because
losses of one year are calculated in the dollars of that year, there should be an
adjustment when losses are applied against the income of other years. Losses
should be deflated by the rate of inflation if carried back and inflated by the
rate of inflation if carried forward in order to achieve the correct offset.
Perhaps it is not surprising that the Treasury did not deal with this issue,
because the timing of gains and losses will still reside with the taxpayer.
Since real capital gains are to be fully included in income, the Treasury,
surprisingly, has made no proposal to tax accrued gains at death. Capital gain
is a form of income upon which taxation is deferred until there is a realization
because of the administrative problem of valuation. Yet assets generally have
to be evaluated at death for purposes of administration and for a declining
number of estates subject to estate tax. Deeming assets to be disposed of at
fair market value at death is a necessary step towards achieving an equitable
income tax and would not impose any substantial administrative problem. An
estate tax is no substitute for constructive realization at death, and a
constructive realization at death is no substitute for an estate tax. At a
minimum, the present rule that the basis of all assets adjusts to equal their fair
market value at death should be changed. With this change, the next step
would be to consider imposing an interest charge for the deferral privilege at
the time of realization as a proxy for the taxation of real gains as they accrue.
This would permit the elimination of rules limiting the deductibility of losses
on the disposition of investment property. A deferral charge at realization
would also reduce the "lock in" problem by making persons with substantial
unrealized gains less reluctant to change their investment portfolio and incur
an immediate tax liability.
2. Depreciation. The Treasury proposes that the basis of depreciable assets
be indexed for inflation 1sS and that depreciation allowance should
151. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 187. The President's Proposals also retain current capital
loss limitation rules. PRES. PROPOSALS, supra note 33, at 172.
152. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 182.
153. 1 TREAs. REPORT, supra note 1, at 105-09. The President's Proposals also index the basis of
depreciable assets. PREs. PRoPosALs, supra note 33, at 132-59.
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approximate real economic depreciation.' 54 Under its proposed Real Cost
Recovery System (RCRS), all depreciable tangible assets would be assigned to
one of seven classes with a fixed depreciation rate ranging from 32% to 3% to
reflect real economic depreciation. 155 A taxpayer would prorate the
depreciation allowance of a newly acquired asset according to the number of
months the asset is placed in service, using a mid-month convention with no
inflation adjustment for the first year.156 In subsequent years, the remaining
unrecovered basis of an asset would be increased annually by the inflation rate
prior to determining the depreciation allowance.' 57 To simplify accounting,
RCRS would allow a taxpayer to close out the depreciation account for any
assets in the year in which only 15% of the inflation adjusted original basis
remains to be depreciated. 15  The inflation adjusted basis of an asset would
be used to compute gain or loss on the disposition or retirement of an asset,
and the gain or loss would be fully included or deducted from income.' 5 9
The current system is regarded by the Treasury as one that is deeply
flawed.' 60 The investment tax credit and the accelerated cost recovery system
(ACRS) were introduced to combat the inflationary erosion of the value of
depreciation allowances. '61 However, with the proposed inflation indexing of
the remaining unrecovered basis of an asset, future depreciation allowances
will maintain their real value. The Treasury has therefore proposed that
investment tax credit and accelerated depreciation be eliminated. 162 The
Treasury believes the proposal possesses a number of significant
advantages. 163 Greater economic neutrality will improve the allocation of
resources. Effective tax rates on depreciable property will no longer vary
according to the asset life, and effective tax rates will no longer vary across
industries. The system will no longer favor investment in depreciable assets
over investment in labor and inventories. Business planning will be more
certain because the value of future depreciation allowances will be
154. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 152-72. The President's Proposals are in accord with the
Treasury's suggestion that depredation should approximate real economic depreciation. PRES.
PROPOSALS, supra note 33, at 134.
155. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 158. The President proposes a Capital Cost Recovery
System (CCRS) that would assign depreciable assets to one of six classes, with depreciation rates
ranging from 55% to 4%. PREs. PROPOSALS, supra note 33, at 138.
156. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 159. The President's Proposals are identical. PREs.
PROPOSALS, supra note 33, at 138.
157. 2 TREAs. REPORT, supra note 1, at 158. The President's Proposals adopt the same system.
PRES. PROPOSALS, supra note 33, at 139.
158. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 158. The President's Proposals have no 15% close-out
provision. In fact, CCRS introduces an additional complexity by switching from a declining-balance
rate to a straight-line depredation method when the straight-line method yields a greater allowance
than the declining-balance method (assuming a half-year convention). PREs. PROPOSALS, supra note
33, at 138.
159. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 158-59. The President's Proposals are identical. PRES.
PROPOSALS, supra note 33, at 142.
160. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 105-06; 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 154-55.
161. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 105.
162. Id at 106. The President's Proposals would also repeal the investment tax credit. PRES.
PROPOSALS, supra note 33, at 160-63.
163. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 106-09; 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 162-63.
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automatically corrected for inflation. The current investment tax credit and
accelerated depreciation are front-loaded and are of little value to new firms
or firms in ailing industries neither of which can fully utilize their benefits.
However, the lowering of the corporate rate from 46% to 33% made possible
by the broadened base will assist all corporations and enhance competition.
The elimination of front-loading of tax benefits will reduce the advantages of
tax shelters and misallocation of resources which is inherent in them.
3. Inventory. The Treasury has proposed that taxpayers be permitted to use
an indexed first in, first out (FIFO) method of inventory tax accounting for
taxation years beginning on or after January 1, 1986.164 The Treasury states
that two-thirds of inventories in the United States are owned by firms which
use FIFO tax accounting. 165 Under FIFO, ending inventories are valued at
most recent purchases or production costs; therefore, during inflation, cost of
goods sold or used is understated and profit is overstated. Under the last in,
first out (LIFO) accounting method, ending inventory is valued at the oldest
purchase or production cost; therefore, in times of rising prices the cost of
goods sold or used is higher than under FIFO. LIFO thus copes with inflation
better than FIFO, but it takes into account only price changes in specific
inventoried goods that may not reflect general price trends, and it results only
in the deferral rather than the elimination of inflationary gains. Under
indexed FIFO, the percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index would be
applied to the number of units in the beginning inventory that does not
exceed the number of units in the ending inventory. 166
Since 1939, taxpayers who use the LIFO method for tax accounting
purposes have been required to use it in preparing their financial statements
for shareholders and for credit purposes. The Treasury proposal would
repeal the conformity requirement, and the requirement for IRS consent to
change to LIFO or to indexed FIFO would be waived during a transition
period. 167
4. Debt. Since nominal interest rates include an inflation premium to
compensate the lender for the loss in real value of the principal, interest
income and expense are overstated by current tax law, which makes nominal
interest receipts fully taxable and nominal payments fully deductible.168 The
Treasury notes that perfect adjustment for inflation would require an annual
deduction by a creditor for each outstanding loan equal to the product of the
164. 1 TREAs. REPORT, supra note 1, at 109-11; 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 189-92. The
President's Proposals are in accord with the Treasury Report. PRES. PRoPosAs, supra note 33, at
174-78.
165. 2 TREAs. REPORT, supra note 1, at 191. But see 1 TREAs. REPORT, supra note 1, at Ill (where
the figure is 95%).
166. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 190. The President's Proposals are identical. PREs.
PRoPosALs, supra note 33, at 175-76.
167. 2 TREAs. REPORT, supra note 1, at 191. The President proposes the same repeal and waiver.
PRES. PRoPosALs, supra note 33, at 176.
168. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 111; 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 193-94.
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inflation rate and the loan principal to recognize the real loss, and a
corresponding inclusion in income by the debtor to recognize the real gain. 69
If, for example, A loans $1,000 to B at a nominal rate of interest of 10% when
the inflation rate is 4% A should be entitled to deduct $40 (inflation rate of
4 % times the loan principal of $1,000) which is the real loss in the value of the
principal. B's liability to repay the principal would correspondingly be
reduced in real terms and he should add $40 to his income. The result is that
A would include a net amount of $60 in income and B would deduct a net
amount of $60 from income. The equivalent result could be obtained by a
fractional interest exclusion equal to the rate of inflation divided by the
nominal rate of interest (4%/10%). A would exclude 40% of the interest
payment of $100 from his income, and B's interest expense would also be
reduced by $40.
According to the Treasury, an inflation adjustment for each outstanding
loan would be extremely complicated. The Report proposes a surrogate
based on the fractional exclusion technique.' 70 The taxpayer would first
determine his net interest income (excluding tax-exempt interest) or expense
(excluding mortgage interest on the principal residence plus $5,000 of
additional interest paid). This net interest income or expense would then be
multiplied by a fractional exclusion rate equal to the rate of inflation divided
by the sum of the rate of inflation and an assumed constant 6% real rate of
return. 17' The net interest income, reduced by the fractional exclusion rate,
would be included in income. The net interest expense, reduced by the
fractional exclusion rate and subject to the interest deduction limitation,
would be deducted from income.
The Treasury concedes that one fractional exclusion rate for all borrowers
and lenders for each rate of inflation would only provide a rough adjustment
for inflation but rightly concludes that such adjustment "will clearly be more
appropriate than the zero inflation assumption implicit in the current law's
treatment of all nominal interest as taxable income or deductible expense."'172
The fractional exclusion proposal would reduce the amount of tax arbitrage.
Many tax avoidance schemes are based on using borrowed funds to acquire
tax-preferred assets. The fractional exclusion of interest will have the
beneficial effect of reducing the attractiveness of such opportunities.
Moreover, if capital gains are to be indexed, an inflation adjustment for
169. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 114.
170. Id. at 111-16; 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 193-200. The President's Proposals would
expand interest subject to the current investment interest limitation to include: (1) interest not
incurred in connection with business (except for interest on a mortgage of the taxpayer's principal
residence if the debt does not exceed the fair market value of the residence); (2) the taxpayer's share
of interest expense of S corporations (except for S corporations in which the taxpayer is an active
participant in management); and (3) the taxpayer's distributive share of interest expense of limited
partnerships of which the taxpayer is a limited partner. Interest subject to the limitation could be
deducted to the extent of the sum of $5,000 ($2,500 if the taxpayer is married but filing a separate
return) and the taxpayer's net investment income. PRES. PROPOSALS, supra note 33, at 323.
171. This estimate of the real rate of interest appears high. Historically the real rate of interest
has generally remained within the range of 1.5% to 3.5%.
172. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 114.
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interest is imperative. Otherwise, in a period of inflation, there would be a
strong incentive for investors in high tax brackets to borrow, obtaining the tax
advantage of debt while investing in capital assets whose indexation shields
them from the impact of inflation. This "clientele effect"' 73 is aggravated by
inflation and the fractional exclusion would have a moderating impact. 74
The approaches to interest deductibility in Canadian and in American law
are significantly different. The Canadian position is that only interest on
borrowed money used to earn income from a business or property may be
deducted. 175 The general rule in the United States is that all interest is
deductible, 176 except that no deduction is allowed to purchase or carry
obligations which generate tax-exempt income. 177 There is also a limitation
on the deductibility of investment interest, 78 but consumer interest-that is,
interest incurred to acquire personal assets-is deductible without limitation
in the United States, while in Canada none is deductible. The Treasury
proposal would, by expanding the current investment interest limitation,
reduce the difference between the two systems. Only mortgage interest on
the taxpayer's principal residence would continue to be deductible without
limit, provided that the debt did not exceed the fair market value. 179 All other
interest not incurred in connection with a trade or business would be subject
to the investment interest limitation and would be deductible only to the
extent of the taxpayer's net investment income plus $5,000.180 Any interest
deduction disallowed would be treated as investment interest expense of the
following year. This provision would represent a substantial tightening of the
investment interest limitation.
Mortgage interest on the taxpayer's principal residence and on the first
$5,000 of any additional interest expense would be unaffected by the
proposal. Except for the first $5,000 of net interest expense, mortgage
interest on the taxpayer's principal residence would receive preferential
treatment over all other interest expense. The fractional exclusion rate would
not be applied to mortgage interest or to the first $5,000 of net interest
expense.' 8 ' This increases the relative attractiveness of mortgage debt
compared with other debt, and higher inflation would make it even more
173. The "clientele effect" is the tendency under a progressive income tax for higher tax-
bracket taxpayers to be net borrowers, because the greater tax saving from the interest deduction
exceeds the increased tax liability of lower bracket taxpayers who therefore tend to be net creditors.
2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 194.
174. Id.
175. Income Tax Act, ch. 63, § 201(l)(c), 1970-1972 Can. Stat 1311, 1370.
176. I.R.C. § 163(a) (Lawyers Co-op. 1974).
177. Id. § 265(2).
178. Id. § 163(d).
179. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 141; 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 194-95. The
President's Proposals are in accord with the Treasury Report. PRES. PROPOSALS, supra note 33, at
323.
180. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 140-41; 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 331-33. Cf.
PRES. PROPOSALS, supra note 33, at 323 (the Proposals expand interest subject to current investment
interest limitations to include three more types of interest).
181. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 194-95.
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attractive. If the present mortgage interest deduction has caused a substantial
over-investment in housing, the proposed changes should reinforce this
tendency.
The Carter Commission rejected the idea of making mortgage interest
payments deductible and criticized the mortgage interest deduction because it
discriminated against the renter.'8 2 However, it failed to recognize that in
denying the deductibility of mortgage interest, the Canadian tax system
discriminates against the homeowner with a large mortgage and in favor of
the homeowner with clear title. A tax system that discriminates against the
35% of households living in rental accommodations is undesirable; but a tax
system that fails to discriminate among the 65% of households in owner-
occupied dwellings whose equity ranges from almost zero to 100% is equally
undesirable. The only really satisfying solution is to include in income the
imputed rental value of owner-occupied dwellings and to permit mortgage
interest and related expenses to be deducted. This system would be fair
between renters and homeowners, and between homeowners with varying
amounts of equity in their homes. Eventually, the imputed rental value of
owner-occupied homes will have to be included in the income tax base in both
the United States and Canada. The desirability of this inclusion has long been
recognized. In 1864, the U.S. Commissioner of Internal Revenue said that
"he was unable to see. . . why one who lives in his own house should not be
taxed on its rental value, as much as if he let it to another and put the rent in
his purse."' 83 Additionally, no ideal treatment of interest in the income tax
system can exist without the imputation of the rental value of owner-occupied
homes.
D. The Dividend-Paid Deduction for Corporations
The Treasury proposes permitting corporations a deduction of 50% of
dividends paid out of profits that have borne the full corporate tax. i1 4 The
Carter Commission proposed full integration of corporate and individual
income tax for resident Canadian shareholders.' 8 5 The corporation tax,
according to the Carter Report, was to become simply a withholding tax that
was to be fully attributed to resident Canadian shareholders through a gross-
up and credit system for dividends and an attribution system for retained
earnings.'8 6 Liquidity problems would be avoided by having a top marginal
tax rate for individuals pegged to the corporate rate of 50%.187
182. 3 CARTER REPORT, supra note 8, at 49. I have indicated that the Canadian approach to the
deductibility of interest is flawed in The Interest Deduction Dilemma, 21 CANADIAN TAX J. 317 (1973).
183. REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 13 (1864), quoted in Hellenbrand,
Itemized Deductions for Personal Expenses and Standard Deductions in the Income Tax Law, 1 TAx REVISION
COMPENDIUM, supra note 43, at 375, 376.
184. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 118-19; 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 134-44. The
President's Proposals would only permit a deduction of 107 of dividends paid. PRES. PROPOSALS,
supra note 33, at 122.
185. 4 CARTER REPORT, supra note 8, at 83.
186. Id. at 83-93.
187. Id at 83.
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The argument that a fair and efficient income tax system necessitates full
integration of individual and corporate tax has gained many adherents.
However, there is doubt about the wisdom of providing relief that is restricted
to distributed corporate income. The Treasury summarily dismisses the
adoption of full integration, citing technical difficulties.' 8 The revenue loss
from full integration also might well have been an important factor because,
after acknowledging the advantage of full relief from double taxation of
dividends, the Treasury says its proposal for half deduction "is based
primarily on considerations of revenue loss."189
The Treasury indicates that the 50% dividend-paid deduction would
reduce the differential treatment of equity and debt capital and thus make
equity securities more competitive with debt.' 90 This may reduce corporate
reliance upon debt capital and decrease the vulnerability of corporations to
risks of bankruptcy caused by cyclical changes in the economy. The Treasury
also indicates that corporations with shareholders in high tax brackets are
encouraged to retain earnings in order to defer income tax at the shareholder
level.' 9 ' The dividend relief from reducing the corporate tax on distributed
earnings by 50% would provide an incentive to pay larger dividends. The
Treasury believes that this would result in efficiency gains for the economy. 192
The corporations that pay larger dividends and seek new funds will, to a
greater extent, be subjected to "the discipline of the marketplace and less
likely to make relatively unproductive investments simply because they have
available funds."' 193 Another efficiency gain foreseen is that the larger
dividend distribution would swell the pool of funds available to new firms with
relatively higher productivity opportunities than the older dividend-paying
corporations.
The proposed full taxation of real capital gains may also have an impact on
corporate dividend policy by reducing the advantages of retaining profit
within the corporation. The Treasury believes that "double taxation of
corporate earnings distributed to shareholders also increases the cost of
capital for corporations and discourages capital-intensive means of
production in the corporate sector."' 194 By reducing the general corporate
rate from 46% to 33%, and providing a 50% dividend-paid deduction, there
should be efficiency gains from the better allocation of capital.
188. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 118.
189. Id. at 119.
190. Id.; 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 141. The President's Proposals reach the same
conclusion on the basis of the 10% deduction. PRES. PROPOSALS, supra note 33, at 126.
191. 2 TREAs. REPORT, supra note 1, at 135. The President's Proposals recognize the same
tendency. PREs. PRoPosALS, supra note 33, at 121.
192. 2 TREAs. REPORT, supra note 1, at 141. The President's Proposals similarly predict
efficiency gains. PREs. PRoPosAms, supra note 33, at 126.
193. 1 TREAs. REPORT, supra note 1, at 19.
194. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 135.
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Having decided that there should be partial relief for dividends, the
Treasury rejects the imputation approach adopted by many countries.' 95
Under an imputation approach, part of the corporation's pre-tax profit and
part of the corporation tax paid is attributed to the shareholder. The
shareholder thus includes in his income the dividend plus a grossed-up
amount to reflect part of the pre-tax profit and receives a credit for part of the
corporation tax paid. The rejection of such an approach is of interest to
Canada because this is the method that we have adopted. However, the
rejection is done in an exceedingly cursory way; the Treasury Report simply
states that "in the context of the United States economy and tax system, an
imputation approach to dividend relief would be extremely cumbersome."' 196
As the Canadian economy and tax system is similar to the American, greater
elaboration on this point would have been preferable.
The Treasury recognizes that the imputation system would permit
dividend relief to be accorded only to American shareholders and that no tax
treaty problem would arise. 197 The Treasury's proposal to allow domestic
corporations a deduction equal to one-half of dividends paid out of fully taxed
earnings would make the relief available to both domestic and foreign
shareholders. To prevent the benefit of the dividend-paid deduction from
accruing to foreign shareholders, the Treasury proposes to levy a
compensatory withholding tax of 16.5% (50% of the proposed corporate
income tax rate of 33% in addition to the current withholding tax.' 9
However, to impose a compensatory withholding tax on dividends paid to
residents of treaty countries, thereby negating the dividend relief accorded to
the company paying the dividend, would constitute a treaty violation because
most treaties establish a maximum rate of withholding tax on dividends.
There is an exact economic equivalence between limiting a credit for
corporate taxes paid under an imputation system to resident shareholders and
imposing a compensatory withholding tax on distributions to foreign
shareholders under a dividend-paid deduction system. But the latter results
in a violation of tax treaties while the former does not. The Treasury,
although it would regard such a violation as only a technical violation, states
that it would not initially impose a compensatory withholding tax on
dividends paid to residents in treaty countries.' 99 It does indicate, however,
that treaty negotiations will be undertaken with countries possessing
imputation systems that have previously not extended the benefits of dividend
195. Id. at 142-43. The President's Proposals also reject an imputation system. PREs.
PROPOSALS, supra note 33, at 127.
196. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 143.
197. Id. at 142. The President's Proposals implicitly recognize that an American imputation
system would not violate tax treaties. PRES. PROPOSALS, supra note 33, at 128.
198. 2 TREAs. REPORT, supra note 1, at 139-40. The President's Proposals would also impose a
compensatory withholding tax of 3.3% (10% of the proposed corporate income tax rate of 33%).
PRES. PROPOSALS, supra note 33, at 125.
199. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 143. Residents of treaty countries would be immune
from the compensatory withholding tax under the President's Proposals as well. PRES. PROPOSALS,
supra note 33, at 126.
[Vol. 48: No. 4
A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE
relief to United States residents in order to reverse that position. 200 The
Treasury also indicates that "[u]nwillingness of treaty partners to negotiate
meaningfully on this issue would cause a reevaluation of the decision
unilaterally to extend benefits to foreign shareholders in treaty countries."20'
When the only reason given for opting for the dividend-paid deduction is that
the imputation system is in some undefined way cumbersome, a major motive
may really be to reopen the treaty issue of dividend relief for United States
residents.
The United States, with far more direct investment in Canada than Canada
has in the United States, would obviously benefit were Canada to accord
dividend relief to United States residents. However, as the Treasury Report
indicates, many countries have adopted partial relief of the double taxation of
dividends "for policy reasons that do not apply equally to the United
States.- 2 0 2 In 1949, Canada first adopted a dividend tax credit which was
available only to individuals residing in Canada. 20 3 The dividend tax credit
was both an attempt to reduce the burden of double taxation of dividends and
an incentive for Canadians to purchase equity stocks of Canadian
corporations. The dividend tax credit of 20% of dividends received from
Canadian corporations reduced the tax burden of all shareholders by an equal
amount per share held. The dividend tax credit is a more equitable way of
providing partial relief than the dividend exclusion method. With dividend
exclusion the value of the exclusion depends on the marginal tax rate of the
shareholder, and the relief is thus accorded in a regressive way. (It is not
surprising that the Treasury has advocated the elimination of the $100
dividend exclusion. 20 4) Canada's current imputation system is more equitable
than a dividend-received tax credit because the excessive taxation is reduced
by the same percentage for all resident taxpayers. Since Canada's imputation
system, a gross-up and credit system, is simply a successor to the dividend tax
credit first implemented in 1949, and since a substantial amount of American
investment in Canada has occurred since preferential treatment was first
accorded to Canadian resident shareholders, Canada may validly and
reasonably decline to make the benefit of dividend relief available to
nonresident taxpayers.
The Treasury Report makes the point that reducing the corporate tax rate
from 46% to 33% and reducing the maximum individual rate from 50% to
35% would reduce the excessive taxation only by a small amount, from 23%
to 21.45% for shareholders in the top marginal rate bracket. This can be seen
in Table 1 by comparing the last lines of columns (4) and (9). The table also
200. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 143. The President's Proposals also suggest reviewed
treaty negotiations. PRES. PROPOSALS, supra note 33, at 129.
201. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 143.
202. Id. at 141.
203. Act of Dec. 10, 1949, Ch. 25, § 17, 1949 Can. Stat. 165, 180.
204. 1 TREAs. REPORT, supra note 1, at 119; 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 145. The
President's Proposals would also repeal the $100 dividend exclusion. PRES. PRoPosALs, supra note
33, at 130.
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indicates that the problem of the classical system, taxing the corporation and
then taxing the shareholder, is basically one of excessive taxation and not one
of double taxation because the greatest excessive taxation occurs when the
marginal tax rate of the shareholder is zero and thus only one level of tax is
paid.
The Treasury Report contends that its corporate level deduction of 50%
of fully taxed corporate earnings paid out as dividends will reduce the
percentage of double taxation by 50%.205 A corporation would be required
to maintain a "Qualified Dividend Account"; each year the amount of taxable
income bearing the full corporate rate would be added to this account, and
dividends paid by the corporation for which there was a dividend-paid
deduction would be subtracted but the balance could never be reduced below
zero.20 6 This description of the Qualified Dividend Account does not appear
to have the effect of reducing the excessive taxation by 50%. If a corporation
earns $100 and pays tax of $33, its Qualified Dividend Account would be
increased by $100. However, if it must declare a dividend of $100, half of
which is deductible in calculating its taxable income (in order to obtain a
rebate of $16.50), the percentage of double taxation being relieved is less
than 50%. For 50% to be relieved, for every dollar of dividends, 100/83.5
must be deducted from the Qualified Dividend Account, and 50% of that
same amount must be deducted in calculating the corporation's taxable
income in order to obtain the appropriate rebate. Thus, if a corporation
earned $100, paid corporate tax of $33, and declared the maximum dividend,
it would not declare a dividend of $67 but would anticipate that half of the
corporate tax would be returned to it and declare a dividend of $83.50 ($67
+ $16.50). The Qualified Dividend Account would be increased by the $100
of profit on which the full corporate rate was paid and should be diminished
by 100/83.5 X 83.50 or $100, by the dividend. The Qualified Dividend
Account would return to zero. The corporation would be entitled to a
deduction of 50% of 100/83.5 X 83.50 or $50, and at a tax rate of 33% this
will trigger a refund of $16.50.
Table 2 indicates that the overtaxation of dividend income would be
reduced by 50%. The Treasury states that the proposal for partial dividend
relief means that "the maximum overall tax rate on corporate earnings
distributed as dividends to individual shareholders would be approximately
45%."207 As shown in column (4) of Table 2, the total tax on corporate
dividends for a person at the top marginal rate of 35% would be 45.73% and
is thus consistent with the Report.
The Treasury Report contends that the dividend-paid deduction should be
limited to ensure that it is only permitted on dividends attributable to
205. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 141.
206. Id. at 136. The President proposes an identical scheme. PRES. PROPOsAMs, supra note 33, at
122-23.
207. 2 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 141.
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TABLE 2
REDUCTION IN EXCESS TAXATION THROUGH THE DIVIDEND-PAID
DEDUCTION
Shareholder's marginal tax rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0% 15% 25% 35%
dollars
1) Coporate profit ......................... 100 100 100 100
2) Corporate tax after dividend deduction ... 16.50 16.50 16.50 16.50
3) Dividend ............................... 83.50 83.50 83.50 83.50
4) Personal tax ............................ 0 12.53 20.88 29.23
5) Total tax .............................. 16.50 29.03 37.38 45.73
6) Tax if earned directly ................... 0 15.00 25.00 35.00
7) Excess taxation ......................... 16.50 14.03 12.38 10.73
8) Excess taxation where not dividend 33 28.05 24.75 21.45
deduction (last line of Table 1, columns
1, 2, 3, and 4) ........................
per cent
9) Percentage reduction ................... 50 50 50 50
corporate earnings that have borne the regular corporate income tax. 20 8 The
Qualified Dividend Account is proposed to carry out this purpose, and the
account would not include any of the corporation's tax preference income.
However, "dividends will be presumed to be paid first from fully taxed
income. ' 20 9 The order in which tax preference income is assumed to be paid
out is exceedingly important; by stacking the preference income last, the most
favorable corporate allocative rule is adopted and thus some tax preferences
will be passed through to the shareholder. A more reasonable allocative rule
for a corporation that has some income that is fully taxed and other income
that enjoys tax preferences would be a proration of the dividend on the basis
of fully taxed income and preference income. If most tax preferences are
eliminated, stacking the preference income last may not be a serious defect.
The Canadian imputation or gross-up and credit system does not depend
upon whether the corporation paid any tax at all upon the income that is
being distributed as a dividend. As long as the dividend is paid by a taxable
Canadian corporation, the individual resident Canadian shareholder takes as
income the dividend plus 50%210 and is entitled to a credit that is equivalent
to 50% of the dividend. 211 If the corporation in fact paid 33 1/3% tax and
distributed all its after-tax income, there would be full integration. The
208. Id. at 136.
209. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 119. The President's Proposals are in accord with the
limitation of this deduction. PREs. PRoPosALs, supra note 33, at 122.
210. Income Tax Act, ch. 1, § 36(1), part I, 1977-1978 Can. Stat. 1, 58 (amending paragraph
82(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act).
211. Income Tax Act (No. 2), ch. 140, part I, § 81(1), 1980-1983 Can. Stat. 3777, 3961
(amending section 121 of the Income Tax Act). Section 121 now provides for a dividend tax credit
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standard corporate rate is 46% but some corporations, particularly in the
extractive industries, pay no corporation tax. Nevertheless, their resident
Canadian shareholders are still entitled to a credit equivalent to 50% of the
dividend paid. Treating tax preferences as equivalent to taxes paid is
inconsistent with the integration concept which was evolved by the Carter
Commission.
Charles E. McClure has stated: "Canada's rejection of full integration in
favor of a form of dividend relief that allows tax preferences to benefit
shareholders in a rather haphazard and inequitable way is usually viewed with
disappointment by public finance experts." 212  However, he does
acknowledge that Canada's imputation system represents "a substantial step
forward from the earlier system that allowed a twenty percent credit for
dividends received, but without gross-up. "213
What is feasible tax reform depends on what has been done previously.
Because Canada had a 20% dividend tax credit granted to shareholders
regardless of whether any tax had been paid by taxable Canadian
corporations, there were strong vested interests intent on ensuring that the
gross-up and credit system would also not depend on corporate taxes actually
paid. The United States, with its strong adherence to the classical system, is
in a position to take a firm stand on granting relief for dividend income. The
stacking of preference income last in determining the availability of the
dividend paid deduction does not constitute a firm stand. Canada is notably
one of the few countries using the imputation system which provides gross-up
and credit without regard to the actual payment of corporate tax. French,
British, and West German systems "have quite detailed provisions intended to
prevent relief from corporate income tax not actually paid." 21 4 The proposed
American dividend-paid deduction could provide relief for corporate tax
which has not been paid.
The dividend-paid deduction for the corporation and the gross-up and
credit system for the individual shareholder can be equivalent because they
both reduce the excessive tax burden on corporate dividends by the same
percentage no matter what the marginal tax rate of the shareholders may
be.215 However, they can be very different in the scope of their coverage.
The Treasury proposes that the dividend-paid deduction be available for
dividends paid to U.S. tax-exempt organizations. 21 6 The Carter Commission
also proposed that tax-exempt Canadian entities should benefit from full
integration. 21 7 However, the gross-up and credit system in Canada has not
of 68% of the gross-up but, after taking into account the provincial tax, this is equivalent to a credit
of 100.64% of the gross-up in provinces levying tax at 48% of the federal tax payable.
212. C. McLuRE, JR., MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE? 71 (1979).
213. Id at 71-72.
214. Id at 69.
215. R. BOADWAY & H. KrrCHEN, CANADIAN TAx PoLIcy 207-09 (2d ed. 1984).
216. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 119. The President's Proposals are silent on the issue of
the availability of the deduction for dividends paid to tax-exempt organizations.
217. 4 CARTER REPORT, supra note 8, at 31.
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been made available to, for instance, Registered Pension Plans. To the extent
that partial dividend relief has encouraged absolute increases in dividends
and has caused corporate shares to increase in value, Registered Pension
Plans have benefited. However, such plans have been denied the direct
benefit of the gross-up and credit. As lower-income Canadians in general
participate indirectly in the stock market through such vehicles as Registered
Pension Plans, denial of the benefit of gross-up and credit to such tax-exempt
entities appears inequitable. The Treasury proposal appears fairer in this
regard, because U.S. tax-exempt organizations are to have the benefit of
dividend relief, even though the Treasury does say that such relief will be
subject to continuing review.218
It may now be time to reconsider the dividend tax credit in Canada. The
Minister of Finance, Michael Wilson, has noted that "the effect of the tax
incentives has been to reduce the average federal corporate income tax rate
from thirty-six percent of financial statement profits to fifteen percent."2 19
These incentives also reduce provincial corporate tax revenue and cause the
total effective corporate tax rate to be about 20% with tax on the small
business corporation being substantially lower. However, the gross-up and
credit system will produce full integration for distributed earnings provided
that the corporation pays tax at 33 1/3%. The system thus on average gives
credit for a large amount of corporate tax that is not paid and therefore
produces superintegration for distributed earnings.
In 1985, a married taxpayer under sixty-five years of age whose only
source of income is dividends from taxable Canadian corporations will be able
to receive up to $51,206 in dividends without paying any federal or provincial
income tax. 2 20 This is a substantial amount of income to be exempt from
personal income taxation, and when one considers the size of the investment
218. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 119.
219. CANADA, DEP'T OF FINANCE, A NEW DIRECTION FOR CANADA 39 (1984).
220. This amount assumes that the individual is entided to the basic personal exemption of
$4,140, the married exemption of $3,630, the $1,000 investment income deduction and receives only
dividend income:
Dividend received ................................................. $51,206
Dividend gross-up ...................................................... $25,603
T otal incom e ............ .............................................. $76,809
Less personal exemptions and deductions
B asic ......................................................... $4 ,140
M arried ....................................................... 3,630
Investm ent deduction .......................................... 1,000
$8,770
Taxable incom e ......................................................... $68,039
Federal tax
Tax on 62,160 - 15,411
Tax on balance = 0.34 (68,039 - 62,160)
- 1,999 $17,410
Less dividend tax credit, 68% of $25,603 ................................ 17,410
N et federal tax ......................................................... 0
Provincial tax ........................................................... 0
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portfolio which is necessary to produce such an amount, the preferential
treatment accorded to dividends is clearly indicated. On January 18, 1985,
the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 Composite had a dividend yield of 3.7%;221
thus, a taxpayer who had dividend income of $51,206 could have a portfolio
with a fair market value of $1,383,946 and pay no personal income tax.222
The justification for this preferential treatment is that the corporation has
prepaid the personal income tax by paying the corporate tax. However, there
are many taxable Canadian corporations that pay no corporate income tax;
moreover, the effective average federal corporate income tax has been
reduced to 15%.223 Reconsidering the gross-up and credit system or
increasing the effective tax rates on corporations seems warranted.
Throughout the period since 1950, the corporate income tax revenue has
been declining as a percentage of total income tax revenue in both Canada
and the United States. This dramatic change is clearly shown in Table 3. The
Treasury's proposals, although revenue neutral, would increase the amount
of tax on corporations and diminish the tax on individuals relative to the tax
revenue which would be raised under current tax law. The Treasury has
estimated total income tax revenue for the period 1986 to 1990 inclusive
under current law to be $2,805.4 billion, of which $541.8 billion or 19.3%
would be corporate income tax revenue. 224 Under the proposals the total
income tax revenue is estimated to be $2,823.0 billion for the same five-year
period, of which $706.9 billion or 25% would represent corporate income tax
revenue.225 The Treasury proposals would reverse the trend indicated in
Table 3. Corporate income tax revenue would no longer continue to
represent a declining proportion of total income tax revenue. This change in
policy is warranted in Canada as well as in the United States to promote a
more neutral tax system which will result in a better allocation of resources. It
is perhaps more urgently required in Canada to justify its very generous
gross-up and credit for dividends.
IV
CONCLUSION
The Treasury Report represents a comprehensive and balanced set of
proposals for fundamental tax reform. Its most significant contribution lies in
the adoption of a comprehensive approach to full indexation of capital
income. This is important because, without a satisfactory measurement of
221. Financial Post, January 26, 1985, at 14.
222. This is determined as follows:
$51.206-Z 100 = $1,383,946
If the individual had $51,206 in dividend income from preferred shares, however, the market value of
his portfolio would be $599,602 on the basis that the average stock yield on January 18, 1985 for 18
preferred shares was 8.54%.
8.54' =$599,602
223. CANADA, DEP'T OF FINANCE, A NEw DIRECrON FOR CANADA 39 (1984).
224. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 45.
225. Id.
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capital income, the attractiveness of a personal consumption tax as a
replacement for the income tax will grow. Consumption occurs inherently in
dollars of the current year and thus measurement is not distorted by inflation.
With a personal consumption tax, there is no need to measure, let alone
index, capital income, but under a fair income tax, capital income must be
indexed.
There is a certain attractiveness about a personal consumption tax but part
of its appeal is based on a false comparison. The ideal personal consumption
tax in the literature is compared with the present "tax expenditure" riddled
income tax. But believing that an ideal personal consumption tax would be
enacted is naive, for lobby groups would demand tax relief for such
worthwhile expenditures as housing and schooling. Thus, the case for change
in the tax base should not rest on the alleged superiority of an ideal
consumption tax but on the superiority of the actual consumption tax which
Congress might finally enact only after enormous effort to convince it and the
public of the desirability of change. Such an enormous effort would be more
effectively expended in obtaining needed reform of the income tax.
The income tax does discriminate against saving as compared to a
consumption tax but unless there is a chronic deficiency of saving or an
unequivocal efficiency or equity gain, there is no reason to move from an
income to a personal consumption tax. Neither consumption nor saving is
per se more virtuous than the other. Economic growth may require, at one
time, consumption expenditure and, at another, more saving and investment.
The idea that persons should be taxed on the basis of their expenditure
and not on their income has some appeal. Nicolas Kaldor has said:
An Expenditure base would tax people according to the amount which they take out of
the common pool, and not according to what they put into it . . . . It is only by
spending, not by earning or saving, that an individual imposes a burden on the rest of
the community in attaining his own ends. 2 26
However, the person who saves uses real resources. This use of current
resources will permit an increase in future consumption in an amount greater
than the current saving. Only the person who puts money under a mattress or
in a cookie jar makes no current, direct or indirect, demand on real resources.
There does not seem to be any common sense reason for preferring a
personal consumption tax. Furthermore, the potential for increased wealth
inequality is substantially enhanced under a personal consumption tax as
compared with a comprehensive income tax.
For the majority of people who receive little inherited wealth and transmit
little wealth, the difference between a personal consumption tax and an
income tax is only a matter of timing. Expenditure is high relative to income
when people are young and establishing families and also during retirement
when accumulated saving is being drawn down. Income is high relative to
expenditure in middle age when home mortgages and other debts are being
repaid and wealth is being accumulated to finance retirement. Thus, under a
226. N. KALDOR, AN EXPENDrrURE TAx 53 (1955).
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personal consumption tax, taxes would be higher during early adulthood and
retirement and lower during middle age than under an income tax. However,
for the wealthy, there would be a substantial difference between a personal
consumption tax and an income tax. Wealth inequality which is already large
would probably grow larger.
The two factors causing wealth inequality are inheritance, which transmits
wealth inequality from one generation to the next, and income inequality,
which currently produces wealth inequality because ability to save increases
more than proportionately to income. A person with income at the
subsistence level cannot save anything, but persons with high incomes have a
large capacity to save and accumulate wealth. Under an income tax, such
persons must first satisfy a tax liability with the result that their capacity to
save is reduced. Under a personal consumption tax, the amount saved
escapes tax. It is not an adequate response to this problem to say that tax
rates can be adjusted in order to achieve any desired distribution of the tax
burden. Average and marginal tax rates would have to be higher under a
personal consumption tax than under a comprehensive income tax because
the base is smaller. But the rate structure must be geared to average
consumption and therefore could not effectively cope with the wealthy person
whose propensity to save is higher than the average. Admittedly, the income
tax is a very blunt instrument to use to reduce wealth inequality because it
only indirectly attacks the problem. Direct measures such as estate and gift
taxes, however, have not been very successful in reducing wealth inequality
caused by inheritance. Therefore, there is little reason either to rely on
wealth transfer taxes or net wealth taxes in order to reduce wealth inequality
directly. It would be a grave mistake to abandon the income tax, for it does
moderate unduly large accumulations of wealth.
Deciding whether our basic tax is to be an income tax or a personal
consumption tax is imperative. 227 The current hodgepodge of preference for
savings and investment in both the United States and Canada has resulted, at
least in part, from a failure to make a clear decision in favor of an income tax.
If a personal consumption tax is a possible objective, tax concessions for
capital income can be condoned because they simply move one towards that
objective. Tax reformers should concentrate on improving the income tax
system rather than extolling the attractive features of a personal consumption
tax. This was the approach adopted by the Treasury. It studied the relative
merits and demerits of a personal consumption tax and concluded that the
disadvantages outweighed the advantages. The Treasury noted that "the
advantages are purchased at the cost of excluding all capital income from tax,
227. I do not contend that it is essential to have a pure income tax but rather to establish clearly
that the basic model is an income tax. Exempting a certain amount of.savings to assist persons to
accumulate funds for their retirement is acceptable but reasonable limits must be determined. The
1984 proposals by the Department of Finance are commendable in their attempt to rationalize and
coordinate the various tax deferral privileges for retirement but I have reservations about the very
high absolute limits. Too high a proportion of taxpayers would have the option of transforming an
income tax into a consumption tax under those proposals.
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a policy which is questionable on equity grounds." 22 8 The idea that taxes
should be levied on the basis of ability to pay is so firmly ensconced that
excluding all saved income from tax will generally be regarded as
unacceptable. Tax reform is difficult under any circumstances, but it is
probably impossible if it challenges basic ideas about fairness.
Whether the Treasury Report becomes law, it, like the Carter Report, is
certain to become a standard to assess other tax reform proposals. The
renewed advocacy of a comprehensive income tax base is an important
message for the United States and Canada today.
228. 1 TREAS. REPORT, supra note 1, at 211.
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